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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 In these consolidated cases, Lawrence Seidman 
("Seidman") and John Bailey ("Bailey") petition for review of the 
order of the Director ("Director") of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision ("OTS") subjecting them to administrative sanctions 
for their part in a loan transaction Crestmont Federal Savings 
and Loan ("Crestmont") considered while Seidman was Chairman of 
Crestmont's Board of Directors ("Board") and Bailey was one of 
its officers.  Specifically, Bailey petitions for review of that 
portion of the Director's order publicly directing him to cease 
and desist from participating in unsafe and unsound lending 
practices.  Seidman's petition seeks review of that portion of 
the Director's order removing him from his office at Crestmont 
and banning him from further participation in the banking 
industry. 
 When the Director issued the order against Seidman and 
Bailey, he remanded the case to an administrative law judge 
("ALJ") to determine their ability to pay civil monetary 
penalties because the ALJ who had heard the case failed to assess 
a civil penalty against Bailey and to properly document Seidman's 
ability to pay the $930,000 civil penalty the ALJ had 
recommended.  The remand order raises a question of finality that 
we must consider before deciding whether we have jurisdiction to 
  
review Bailey's and Seidman's petitions.  We conclude in Part II 
that we do have jurisdiction.1 
 In the administrative proceeding, the Director found 
Bailey approved a commitment for a purchase money mortgage to a 
real estate buyer who was buying property from a seller in which 
Seidman had an interest.  The Director concluded that approval of 
this commitment was an unsafe and unsound lending practice 
justifying a cease and desist order against Bailey under section 
1818(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDIA"), 12 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1811-1833 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994), as amended by the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 ("FIRREA"), P.L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 
 The Director concluded that Seidman's conduct required 
him to issue a prohibition and removal order in accord with 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1818(e).  To support this ultimate administrative 
sanction the Director found Seidman impermissibly used his 
position at Crestmont for his own benefit in order to obtain a 
release from his personal guarantee of a loan; this loan had been 
made by another lending institution to a real estate partnership 
                     
1
.  Seidman and Bailey also attack the remand order on the 
merits.  Because we will grant Bailey's petition and reverse the 
cease and desist order against him, those proceedings can no 
longer continue against Bailey.  We will therefore order the 
Director to terminate them.  Because of our conclusion on 
Seidman's petition that his case be remanded for the Director to 
consider entry of a cease and desist order against him, we will 
stay the proceedings against him concerning assessment of any 
monetary penalties until the Director has finally decided whether 
to direct Seidman to cease and desist from any further attempts 
to hinder OTS in any investigations pertinent to its regulatory 
authority. 
  
from which Seidman was in the process of withdrawing; Seidman's 
withdrawal from the partnership was being negotiated at the same 
time that Bailey made the loan commitment for a purchase from the 
partnership, resulting in the Director's cease and desist order 
against him.  As additional support for his order removing 
Seidman from Crestmont's Board of Directors and banning him from 
banking for life, the Director also found that Seidman failed to 
renotify Crestmont's Board or Senior Loan Committee of his 
continuing interest in the real estate partnership he was 
withdrawing from while they were considering the loan OTS 
objected to and that Seidman later attempted to hinder the 
ensuing OTS investigation by covering up his part in preparing a 
memo in support of his request for the release.  The Director 
concluded that each of these findings warranted Seidman's removal 
as Chairman of Crestmont's Board and required him to be 
permanently barred from banking. 
 We believe the Director erred in concluding Bailey's 
issuance of a purchase money loan commitment to a buyer from the 
real estate development partnership from which Seidman was in the 
final stages of withdrawing exposed Crestmont to the serious, 
abnormal risk that constitutes an unsafe or unsound practice.  
Therefore, we will grant Bailey's petition for review and vacate 
that part of the Director's order commanding Bailey to cease and 
desist from such practices. 
 We reject Seidman's preliminary argument that 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1818(e) violates due process because it fails to 
afford him a trial before a fair and unbiased tribunal.  We 
  
conclude, however, that the Director's findings that Seidman 
violated 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(1) when he sought to utilize his 
position at Crestmont to obtain a release from his guarantee and 
when he failed to remind Crestmont's Board or Senior Loan 
Committee of his interest in the real estate partnership are not 
supported by substantial evidence.  Though the Director properly 
determined that Seidman engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice 
when he attempted to hinder the OTS investigation, we conclude 
that there is no evidence to support the Director's finding that 
this act of Seidman resulted in his receipt of an actual benefit 
meeting section 1818(e)(1)(B)(iii)'s condition of an untoward or 
prohibited effect.2  Accordingly, we will grant Seidman's 
petition for review and vacate that part of the Director's order 
permanently removing him from his job at Crestmont and banning 
him from banking.  Nevertheless, because of our conclusion that 
Seidman did commit an unsafe or unsound practice when he 
unsuccessfully attempted to hinder the OTS investigation in his 
dealings with his former partners and their lender, we will 
remand the case to OTS for the Director to consider entering a 
cease and desist order and civil monetary penalties against 
Seidman as authorized by section 1818(b). 
                     
2
.  The Director relied exclusively on section 
1818(e)(1)(B)(iii)'s receipt of benefit from a prohibited act to 
meet its requirements concerning effect and made no finding that 
Seidman's conduct met the alternate requirement of section 
1818(e)(1)(B)(i) by posing a possibility of prejudice to 
Crestmont's depositors or the other alternate condition of 
section 1818(e)(1)(B)(ii) by creating a likelihood of loss to 
Crestmont. 
  
 Our disposition of the merits of Seidman's petition 
requires us to vacate the OTS preliminary suspension order for 
the reasons given in Part VII of this opinion.  Therefore, we 
find it unnecessary to consider Seidman's appeal of the district 
court's order dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his action to 
enjoin the preliminary suspension order. 
 
 I.  Factual and Procedural History 
 A.  Seidman's Business Dealings 
 Lawrence Seidman is an attorney in his mid-forties who 
has been engaged in the practice of banking and securities law 
for twenty years.  During the past decade he has specialized in 
real estate investments and begun to pursue a career in banking.  
In 1989, he headed a group of investors who purchased stock in 
Crestmont, a thrift institution in Edison, New Jersey.3  Seidman 
became a director of Crestmont and, in November 1989, was named 
Chairman of its Board of Directors. 
 In 1986, before he became a Crestmont director, Seidman 
formed a partnership, Fulton Street Associates ("FSA"), with 
James Zorlas ("Zorlas") and Lawrence Rappaport ("Rappaport") to 
purchase and develop industrial condominiums on a piece of 
commercial property ("Boonton Project").  FSA's partners made 
substantial capital contributions to the Boonton Project and 
                     
3
.  At the time the parties argued and briefed these cases, 
Crestmont was not one of the failed thrifts that led to the 
"S & L bailout."  We have not been advised of any change in this 
respect. 
  
obtained additional financing from United Jersey Bank ("UJB"), 
secured in part by all the partners' personal guarantees.  
Seidman listed his affiliation with FSA on conflict disclosure 
forms he filed with Crestmont when he became a director. 
 In mid-1990, Seidman decided to focus his business 
activities on Crestmont.  Recognizing that his outside business 
ventures could create conflicts that would prevent Crestmont from 
making otherwise desirable loans, Seidman advised the Board that 
he had begun to withdraw from his outside business ventures and 
started disposing of various business interests to his former 
partners.  Rappaport agreed to acquire Seidman's interest in FSA, 
promising to indemnify Seidman against any continuing obligation 
on FSA's loan from UJB without any further consideration flowing 
to Seidman.  On June 1, 1991, Seidman's transfer of his interest 
in FSA to Rappaport became the subject of a formal agreement.  
Seidman testified that he lost all of the $320,000 he had 
invested in FSA but that he thought Crestmont offered even 
greater potential for profit. 
 Months before the June 1st agreement, however, UJB 
started to worry about its loan to FSA.  On January 21, 1991, it 
sent FSA a notice of default.  UJB gave FSA a chance to cure the 
default, but FSA denied it was in default, contending any default 
would have been cured if an interest reserve fund had been 
properly credited against its debt.  Though UJB then sent FSA a 
demand for immediate payment, negotiations between them 
continued. 
  
 James Risko ("Risko"), a Poole & Co. commercial loan 
broker, handled negotiations to resolve the dispute between FSA 
and UJB.  Poole & Co. was the commercial loan company that had 
placed the FSA loan with UJB.  Roger Eberhardt ("Eberhardt"), 
chairman of UJB's real estate management committee, and Thomas 
Stackhouse ("Stackhouse"), the UJB commercial lending officer 
assigned to the FSA loan, were key participants in the 
negotiations.  Risko, Eberhardt and Stackhouse all testified that 
the participants, including Seidman, discussed end-user financing 
for FSA's Boonton condominiums.4  Crestmont was mentioned as a 
potential source of end-user loans, but no one testified that 
Seidman or Crestmont promised to make any loan.  On May 20, 1991, 
the parties agreed to restructure the UJB loan.  As part of the 
restructuring, the FSA partners, including Seidman, signed 
personal guarantees covering $4.45 million.  Seidman's successful 
efforts to be released from the guarantee figure prominently in 
these proceedings, but other ongoing events also play a 
significant role. 
 
                     
4
.  End-user financing permits a person who plans to occupy a 
unit in a development to buy the unit or rent it to others.  The 
institution that has financed the project has a strong interest 
in facilitating end-user financing because it usually receives a 
substantial part of the price the end-user pays, thus reducing 
its exposure on the loan to the developer. 
  
 B.  The Levine Loan 
 John Bailey is the Executive Vice President of 
Crestmont.  His responsibilities include underwriting commercial 
loans, managing a commercial loan portfolio, producing new 
lending business and supervising Crestmont's loan officers.  
Bailey had authority to approve loans of less than $500,000 if 
they did not directly involve the interests of Crestmont's 
directors but had no authority to approve loans in excess of 
$500,000 or loans in which Crestmont's officers or directors had 
an interest.  Loans over $500,000 went before a "Senior Loan 
Committee" made up of Bailey, Seidman and Crestmont's President, 
S. Griffin McClellan ("McClellan").  Commercial loans in which an 
officer or director had an interest were prohibited at Crestmont. 
 In December of 1990, Steven Levine ("Levine") of S & N 
Realty approached Bailey about end-user financing for a $466,000 
office condominium in FSA's Boonton project.  Levine, who had 
been referred to Crestmont and Bailey by Zorlas, sought $375,000.  
On December 18, 1990, Bailey contacted Zorlas, Rappaport and 
Seidman about Levine's loan request and asked them how things 
stood on Seidman's partnership interest in FSA.  All three FSA 
partners individually represented to Bailey that Seidman was in 
the process of withdrawing from the partnership and that the 
withdrawal would be completed "shortly."  Bailey Appendix 
("Bailey App.") at 319.  Bailey memorialized this conversation 
and placed a memo about it in a file marked "Seidman Financial 
Associates."  Id.  Rappaport testified he told Bailey no loan 
could be made to Levine until Seidman was out of the partnership. 
  
 Assured Seidman would soon be out of FSA, Bailey 
decided to get a head start on the Levine loan and assigned James 
Little ("Little"), a Crestmont loan officer, the task of writing 
it up.  Little interviewed Levine and told him the loan could be 
approved but no other action could be taken on it until Seidman 
left FSA.  Little became involved with other things and gave the 
paperwork on the loan back to Bailey to complete.  Still assured 
that Seidman would soon be out of FSA, Bailey did extensive work 
on it. 
 Bailey prepared a Credit Summary for the Levine loan on 
February 21, 1991.5  On March 19, 1991, Bailey and Little 
approved the loan and issued a commitment letter to Levine.6  
                     
5
.  In the Credit Summary form there is a space headed "Bank 
Officers and Directors Interest."  Bailey says he thought this 
heading referred to the officers and directors of the Levine 
partnership, not FSA, the developer.  Bailey also listed the 
applicant as "[a] N.J. General Partnership, the ownership of 
which is 100% Steven K. Levine and Ned Levine."  Bailey App. at 
321.  Clarence Hartwick, a twenty-seven year veteran in banking 
and an executive at First Fidelity Bank in New Jersey, 
corroborated Bailey's understanding at a hearing before an OTS 
ALJ.  He testified: 
 
 That line refers to the borrower.  Is the 
borrower an officer or director of the bank, 
it's as simple as that. 
 
Id. at 304.  Bailey entered the word "none" on the line calling 
for disclosure of "Bank Officers and Directors Interest."  Id. at 
321.  Other underwriting documents included with the Credit 
Summary clearly disclosed FSA's interest. 
6
.  The commitment was later modified and reissued on May 10, 
1991.  Unknown to Bailey, Levine had already entered into a 
Contract of Sale with FSA on or about May 10, 1991.  Seidman did 
not formally withdraw from FSA until June 1, 1991.  Questioned 
about what would have happened if Seidman had failed to withdraw 
from a similar transaction, Crestmont's President, McClellan, 
testified, "We would not have closed the loan.  It was clearly 
  
Levine did not sign the commitment letter until May 30, 1991, 
when Bailey was given a check for $2,000 in exchange for the 
commitment.7 
 
 C.  Crestmont's Loan Policies 
 Crestmont had a loan policy which Bailey had authored.  
It was based on OTS regulations and stated: 
  The policy of the bank is to carefully 
administer extensions of credit which are 
subject to special reporting requirements.  
These loans include the following: 
 
  . . . 
 
  - [L]oans to individuals or entities 
that conduct business or have 
conducted business with officers or 
directors of the bank. 
 
  These situations are clearly described 
in the bank's loan committee credit summary.  
They are presented to the bank's Senior Loan 
Committee regardless of their size. 
 
 
Id. at 314.  Crestmont had another policy, also based on OTS 
regulations, which forbade it from 
 either directly or indirectly mak[ing] any 
loan to or purchase . . . any loan made to 
(..continued) 
understood by all involved that that was a condition to closing."  
Id. at 191. 
7
.  Crestmont negotiated that instrument but the date of 
negotiation is unclear.  OTS contends that the check was 
negotiated before June 1, 1991, the date Seidman transferred his 
interest, but Bailey contends the check was cashed after Seidman 
relinquished his partnership.  Levine's delivery of the check for 
$2,000 resulted in a binding contract two days before Seidman's 
formal withdrawal.  See generally Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 17 (1981). 
  
any third party on the security of real 
property purchased from any affiliated person 
of the association unless the property was a 
single-family dwelling owned and occupied by 
the affiliated person as a permanent 
residence. 
 
 
OTS Appendix ("OTS App.") at 96-97 (citing 12 C.F.R. 
§ 563.43(c)(1)).  Crestmont's policies also put on its directors 
 a fundamental duty to avoid placing 
themselves in any position which creates, 
leads to or could lead to a conflict of 
interest or even the appearance of such 
conflict of interest between the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the 
association and the personal financial 
interests of the directors, officers and 
other affiliated persons. 
 
 
Id. at 98-99 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 571.7).  Specifically, 
Crestmont's directors were supposed to avoid any transaction in 
which 
 a third party purchaser seeks to obtain a 
loan from the association secured by real 
estate acquired from the affiliated 
partnership or as to which the affiliated 
partnership holds a security interest. 
 
 
Id. at 100.  Bailey and Seidman were fully aware of these 
policies. 
 
  
 D.  The Garden Park Loan 
 At the same time that Crestmont was negotiating the 
Levine loan, Seidman and OTS were engaged in a tense dialogue 
over property owned by Garden Park Associates ("Garden Park"), 
for which Seidman was attempting to arrange financing at 
Crestmont.  Seidman had an interest in Garden Park and had also 
personally guaranteed the development loans for Garden Park.  
Seidman fully disclosed his interest in Garden Park to the 
Crestmont Board and Crestmont formally asked OTS to permit it to 
make the Garden Park loan.  On May 23, 1991, OTS denied 
Crestmont's request citing 12 C.F.R. § 563.43(c)(1) (1991) which 
forbade certain transactions with affiliated parties.8  Seidman 
contacted OTS's Chief Examiner in charge of Crestmont, Joseph 
Donohue ("Donohue"), for a further explanation of OTS's position.  
Donohue told Seidman that OTS considered the Garden Park loan 
impermissible so long as Seidman remained a guarantor of Garden 
Park's obligation.  Seidman asked for reconsideration, but OTS 
still refused to allow the loan. 
 
                     
8
.  OTS amended this regulation subsequent to the ALJ's decision, 
but the Code of Federal Regulations no longer contains any 
independent OTS conflict of interest rules.  Instead, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 563.43 incorporates the Federal Reserve Board regulations found 
at 12 C.F.R. § 215 et seq.  See 57 Fed. Reg. 45,977 (1992) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563.43).  There is no provision in the 
Federal Reserve Board regulations comparable to former 12 C.F.R. 
§ 563.43(c)(1).  For the text of former section 563.43(c)(1), see 
infra typescript at 44. 
  
 E.  Seidman's Release from the UJB Guarantee 
 Until his May 23, 1991, conversation with Donohue, 
Seidman seems to have believed that his withdrawal from FSA would 
permit Crestmont to make the Levine loan.  After speaking with 
Donohue about Garden Park, Seidman had second thoughts about his 
personal guarantee of FSA's loan from UJB and began to wonder 
whether it would disqualify Crestmont from loaning money to 
Levine even after Seidman completed his withdrawal from FSA.  
Seidman turned to James Poole ("Poole") of Poole & Co., who 
advised Seidman to get a release from the UJB guarantee and to 
discuss this with Risko.   Seidman did so and Risko approached 
Eberhardt.  Risko told Eberhardt that the conflict between 
Seidman's obligation on the guarantee and his fiduciary duties to 
Crestmont created problems in Crestmont's providing end-user 
financing for the FSA project.  Eberhardt told Risko to put a 
proposal for Seidman's release in writing and UJB would consider 
it. 
 Events now moved rapidly.  On May 30, 1991, the day 
Levine signed the commitment letter, Risko contacted Seidman and 
told him UJB would consider releasing Seidman.  Risko suggested 
Seidman draft a letter asking for the release and that he, Risko, 
would sign a letter giving UJB the reasons for granting Seidman's 
request.  Risko testified Seidman and he agreed that Seidman 
would do an initial draft of both the request for release and 
Risko's supporting letter.  Risko testified he was only to 
approve and sign the supporting letter and that Seidman faxed him 
  
the draft.  Seidman testified that Risko dictated the draft to 
Seidman's secretary and she forwarded it to Risko for review. 
 While drafts were being faxed back and forth between 
Risko and Seidman, OTS examiner Thomas Angstadt ("Angstadt") was 
at Crestmont on other business.  While using a Crestmont fax 
machine, Angstadt saw a copy of the draft of Risko's letter lying 
on a desk.  Angstadt secretly read and copied the draft. 
 The final version of Risko's letter was identical with 
the draft except for one sentence that Risko added.9  Seidman had 
no objection to Risko's addition. 
 On June 7, 1991, UJB notified Seidman that it would 
release him from his guarantee of FSA's loan.  Eberhardt later 
testified UJB understood that the release did not obligate 
                     
9
.  Risko's supporting letter reads as follows, with the sentence 
Risko added emphasized in bold face type: 
 
 As you are aware, Mr. Seidman is the Chairman 
of the Board of Crestmont Federal Savings and 
Loan Association and Crestmont is 
entertaining financing certain condo 
purchasers who are purchasing units from 
Fulton Street.  His position as Chairman may 
make this financing impossible if he is also 
a partner in Fulton Street.  The inability to 
finance the end users, in our opinion, does 
not serve either United Jersey Bank's 
position or that of the developer.  At the 
present time, Crestmont is entertaining 
$700,000 in financing for two users and a 
third potential buyer has indicated the need 
for approximately $1 million in financing.  
Crestmont would be willing to consider future 
financing of condo units in the Boonton area, 
assuming qualified buyers. 
 
OTS App. at 2 (emphasis added). 
  
Crestmont to provide such financing, but he prepared a 
handwritten memo that indicated availability of end-user 
financing from Crestmont was a consideration in UJB's decision to 
release Seidman. 
 In the meantime, on June 3, 1991, OTS prohibited the 
Garden Park loan, and Seidman again asked Donohue for an 
explanation.  Donohue now told Seidman that OTS believed conflict 
of interest prevented a thrift from making a loan to an entity in 
which an officer or director of the thrift had had an interest, 
including liability on a guarantee, at any time within two years 
before the loan was made.  Seidman protested that such a policy 
had no support in OTS regulations, but Donohue was not moved. 
 Frustrated, Seidman ordered Bailey to stop considering 
commercial loans on projects in which Seidman had an interest 
either as a partner or guarantor.  On June 4, 1991, Bailey sent 
both the Levine and the Garden Park loans to the Savings Bank of 
Rockland.10  On June 5, 1991, OTS issued a supervisory directive 
forbidding Crestmont from making any commercial loans and 
launched the investigation for "conflict of interest" that gave 
rise to the cases now before us.11  It is undisputed that 
Crestmont never made the loans OTS questioned. 
                     
10
.  Seidman is also a member of the Board of Directors at 
Rockland, but that lending institution is regulated by FDIC, not 
OTS. 
11
.  The transfer of the loan documents took place one day before 
the OTS supervisory directive and three days before Seidman 
received word that he would be released from his guarantee of the 
UJB loan.  Thus, neither the OTS order to cease commercial 
transactions nor the outcome of the UJB proceedings induced 
Crestmont's decision to transfer the loans. 
  
 
 F.  The OTS Investigation, Charges and 
 Seidman's District Court Action 
 Though Crestmont had made no prohibited loan and now 
proposed none, OTS went on with its investigation into what it 
suspected were violations of OTS's regulations on conflict of 
interest.  On September 13, 1991, OTS deposed Seidman, focusing 
on the draft letter Seidman had faxed to Risko.  Seidman never 
admitted writing the original draft of Risko's letter.  He said 
he believed that Risko had dictated it over the phone to 
Seidman's secretary, Janet Greenhill ("Greenhill").  Greenhill 
testified she did not remember these details.12  Seidman admitted 
that he had approved the text of the letter as sent with the 
additional sentence stating it would be in UJB's best interest to 
free him from the guarantee because that could open another 
source of end-user financing for FSA. 
 After he was deposed, Seidman learned that Risko and 
Poole & Co.'s records had been subpoenaed by OTS and that Risko 
planned to testify on deposition without an attorney.  Seidman 
called Risko to find out what Poole & Co.'s files contained 
concerning Seidman's request for a release from his guarantee and 
asked whether he could review the file.  Risko testified he told 
                     
12
.  Greenhill did testify it was her practice to put Seidman's 
initials on any letter he dictated to her and there were no such 
initials on the initial draft of Risko's letter.  She also 
testified it was not unusual for her to take dictation from 
others over the phone. 
  
Seidman that he had a fax of the initial draft along with the fax 
sheets showing it was transmitted from Crestmont. 
 On September 16, 1991, before his OTS deposition, Risko 
met with Seidman.  Seidman testified Risko told him he was going 
to tell OTS the letter was Seidman's idea.  Seidman testified he 
told Risko this was a lie.  Seidman said he reviewed the file and 
pulled out a number of documents relating to his request for a 
release.  Risko testified Seidman asked him to "make sure that 
[the documents] get thrown away" and asked Risko to do his "best 
to make sure [the documents were] not around."  Seidman Appendix 
("Seidman App.") at 347-48.  Risko also testified that Seidman 
told him to forget the documents ever existed.  Seidman 
emphatically denies ever saying this.  Both Risko and Seidman 
agree that Seidman told Risko he should tell OTS the truth. 
 Things grew tense.  Risko left the room to speak with 
Poole.  Seidman was left alone with the documents.  Poole 
reentered the conference room, picked up the draft, crumpled it 
and left the room with it.  Seidman followed Poole to his office 
where they had a heated exchange.  Seidman grabbed the crumpled 
copy of the draft and tore it up.  Seidman testified he did this 
"in a rage of anger" after learning Risko had made copies of all 
the relevant documents.  Id. at 481-82.  Risko testified he never 
informed Seidman that copies existed.13 
                     
13
.  The ALJ found Seidman destroyed the documents intentionally 
but "it was done in a fit of anger and not for the purpose of 
destroying material and relevant evidence."  Seidman App. at 49.  
The Director's decision concluded cryptically that the ALJ found 
Seidman had destroyed material evidence.  While the ALJ found 
  
 On October 30, 1991, OTS filed notice of charges 
against Seidman and Bailey.14  On the same day, it issued a 
preliminary Order of Suspension removing Seidman from his posts 
at Crestmont without pay.15  From April 20, 1992, through May 1, 
1992, Treasury Department ALJ Walter Alprin ("Alprin") held 
hearings on the charges against Seidman and Bailey.  On 
August 13, 1992, Alprin issued his decision recommending that the 
Director issue a Removal and Prohibition Order permanently 
barring Seidman from any work in the banking field and assessing 
$930,000 in civil penalties against him.  Alprin also recommended 
an order directing Bailey to "cease and desist from engaging in 
(..continued) 
Seidman engaged in a number of culpable acts, it seems clear that 
the ALJ did not think destruction of evidence was one of them. 
14
.  The OTS sought the following relief against Seidman:  (1) a 
preliminary order immediately suspending Seidman from his office 
at Crestmont and from further participating in Crestmont's 
affairs; (2) an order removing Seidman from his office at 
Crestmont and banning him from the banking industry; (3) 
disgorging any unjust enrichment or avoidance of loss; (4) 
providing a new guarantee to UJB on the FSA loan; (5) civil 
monetary penalties; and (6) any other relief the Director deemed 
appropriate. 
15
.  Seidman commenced a district court action seeking a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin further enforcement of the Order 
of Suspension on February 7, 1992.  In his complaint, Seidman 
alleged that the Order of Suspension was facially invalid because 
it exceeded OTS's statutory authority.  On February 17, 1992, OTS 
filed a motion for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, summary 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  On May 22, 
1992, the district court granted OTS's Rule 12(b)(1) motion and 
dismissed the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions as moot.  Because 
we will grant Seidman's petition for review and reverse the 
Director's order removing him from office and banning him from 
banking, we do not consider Seidman's appeal of the May 22, 1992 
order.  See infra Part VII. 
  
any unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the business of any 
financial institution . . . ."  Id. at 89.  Alprin did not 
recommend any monetary penalty against Bailey. 
 
 G.  The Director's Decision 
 Seidman and Bailey sought the Director's review of the 
ALJ's recommended decision and asked for oral argument.  The 
Director denied the request for argument and issued a decision on 
December 4, 1992, finding against Seidman and issuing the Removal 
and Prohibition Order the ALJ had recommended.  The Director 
determined, however, that the record was not sufficient to 
support the recommended civil penalty of $930,000 against Seidman 
and remanded the case to the ALJ to take further evidence 
concerning Seidman's ability to pay.16  The Director also agreed 
with the ALJ's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of 
law as to Bailey and entered a Permanent Cease and Desist Order, 
but he disagreed with the ALJ's conclusion that no civil 
penalties were warranted against Bailey and sent Bailey's case 
back for further fact finding on money penalties. 
 In support of his order removing Seidman and banning 
him from banking, the Director found Seidman engaged in self-
                     
16
.  On January 15, 1993, Seidman challenged the legality of the 
remand by filing a motion with the Director to stay further 
proceedings before the ALJ.  He also sought a stay from this 
Court.  We denied Seidman's request for a stay without stating 
whether our denial was on the merits or because Seidman had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  The motion before 
OTS remained undecided at the time Seidman filed his opening 
brief in this Court (March 1993).  We have not been advised of 
any subsequent action. 
  
interested conduct by insinuating to UJB that a release from his 
FSA guarantee would cause Crestmont to provide end-user financing 
for FSA's Boonton project.  The Director also found that 
Crestmont unlawfully made a loan commitment to Levine while 
Seidman was still a partner in FSA.  Finding these acts of self-
dealing were never disclosed to Crestmont's Board or the Senior 
Loan Committee, the Director held Seidman breached his fiduciary 
duties to Crestmont.  The Director also held Seidman violated 
OTS's conflict of interest provision, 12 C.F.R. § 571.7(b), and 
sought to benefit personally from these acts through the release 
from his FSA guarantee. 
 The Director independently held that Seidman's attempt 
to destroy evidence and cover-up his activities during the 
investigation violated section 1818(e)(1).  He found the 
attempted cover-up, which involved giving misleading testimony, 
destroying the original record of the fax of the early draft of 
Risko's letter from Seidman to Risko and requesting that Risko 
forget about the letter, inter alia, constituted an unsafe or 
unsound practice.  The Director concluded that these acts 
established personal dishonesty within the meaning of section 
1818(e)(1)(C)(i) and conferred a personal benefit on Seidman 
within the meaning of section 1818(e)(1)(B)(iii). 
 The Director also held Bailey had engaged in an unsafe 
and unsound banking practice.  He found Bailey knew of Seidman's 
interest in FSA, failed to disclose it to the Board of Directors 
or the Senior Loan Committee and issued a commitment letter for 
the Levine loan before Seidman withdrew from FSA.  The Director 
  
concluded this created an "abnormal risk of loss" to Crestmont 
and that a cease and desist order was appropriate under section 
1818(b).  Seidman App. at 121. 
 
 II.  Jurisdiction 
 The Director had jurisdiction over these proceedings 
pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(h)(1).  Seidman and Bailey filed 
timely petitions for review pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(h)(2).  
Because of the Director's remand to an ALJ for further findings 
on Seidman's and Bailey's ability to pay civil penalties, we must 
consider whether their petitions seek review of a final order.  
Generally, an order which decides all issues of liability but 
remands on issues of damages is not immediately appealable.  See 
Teledyne Continental Motors v. United States, 906 F.2d 1579, 1582 
(Fed. Cir. 1990).  Here the agency clearly contemplates further 
action concerning civil penalties.  So long as the assessment of 
monetary penalties is pending, the full impact the Director's 
decisions may have on either Seidman or Bailey is uncertain. 
 Under FDIA, parties sanctioned by OTS 
 may obtain a review of any order . . . by the 
filing in the court of appeals of the United 
States for the circuit in which the home 
office of the depository institution is 
located . . . within thirty days after the 
date of service of such order, a written 
petition praying that the order of the agency 
be modified, terminated, or set aside. . . .  
Upon the filing of such petition, such court 
shall have jurisdiction, which upon the 
filing of the record shall . . . be 
exclusive, to affirm, modify, terminate, or 
set aside, in whole or in part, the order of 
the agency.  Review of such proceedings shall 
  
be had as provided in chapter 7 of Title 5.  
The judgment and decree of the court shall be 
final, except that the same shall be subject 
to review by the Supreme Court upon 
certiorari . . . . 
 
 
12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(h)(2) (West 1989).  Nothing in FDIA expressly 
states that the "order" must be a final one.  We recognized in 
Shea v. OTS, 934 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1991), however, "'there is a 
strong presumption that judicial review is only available when an 
agency action becomes final . . . .'"  Id. at 44 (quoting Bell v. 
New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983)).  This presumption 
recognizes that postponement of review until final action can 
sometimes avoid the inefficiency of piecemeal review and, in some 
cases, make any review unnecessary.  CEC Energy Co. v. Public 
Serv. Comm., 891 F.2d 1107, 1112 (3d Cir. 1989); see also 
Fidelity Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 502 
F.2d 443, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Chicago & Southern Air 
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) and 
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 & n.24 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954)). 
 In Shea we concluded, "in this Circuit, the finality of 
a disposition is determined by its consequences[,]" including 
"whether the OTS's decision 'imposes an obligation' or 'denies a 
right.'"  Shea, 934 F.2d at 44-45.  In CEC Energy we reasoned 
that "[a]pplication of the ripeness doctrine prevents the 
entanglement of the courts in administrative policy disagreements 
and protects the agencies from judicial interference until 
decisions are formalized and their effects felt in a concrete 
  
way."  CEC Energy Co., 891 F.2d at 1109 (citation omitted).  We 
went on to state, "[t]he doctrine of ripeness requires an 
evaluation of the fitness of the challenged issue for review and 
the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial 
consideration."  Id. at 1109-10 (citation omitted); see also 
Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Standard Oil, Inc., 449 U.S. 232 (1980); 
Solar Turbines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1080 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(concluding Supreme Court's finality standard incorporates 
ripeness standard).  An important but not dispositive factor is 
an agency's classification of its order as final.  Because 
finality is a pragmatic requirement informed but not decided by 
an agency classification of its decision, we looked at several 
other factors in CEC Energy: 
 1) whether the decision represents the 
agency's definitive position on the question; 
2) whether the decision has the status of law 
with the expectation of immediate compliance; 
3) whether the decision has immediate impact 
on the day-to-day operations of the party 
seeking review; 4) whether the decision 
involves a pure question of law that does not 
require further factual development; and 5) 
whether immediate judicial review would speed 
enforcement of the relevant act. 
 
 
CEC Energy Co., 891 F.2d at 1110 (citing Solar Turbines Inc., 879 
F.2d at 1080).  Thus, we turn to the facts that are material to 
our jurisdiction over Seidman's and Bailey's petitions for 
review. 
 Under the Director's order, Seidman is permanently 
removed from, and prohibited from returning to, the banking 
industry.  The order denies Seidman a right to pursue the trade 
  
he has chosen.  It also firmly concludes that Seidman is not fit 
to be a banker and that Bailey should be publicly reprimanded.  
The order notifies Seidman and Bailey of their right to petition 
for judicial review and the agency states it is final.  Most 
significantly, the order demands immediate compliance and impacts 
immediately on Seidman's and Bailey's day-to-day affairs.  OTS is 
currently enforcing the order precluding Seidman from taking part 
in the business of banking, and it is clear the agency has 
definitely decided to ban Seidman from that industry.  Although 
the consequences to Bailey are not as harsh as those visited upon 
Seidman, the agency has indicated that it will engage in no 
further factual development or reconsideration of its order 
publicly directing Bailey to cease and desist from unsafe 
practices.  The order has a continuing effect on Bailey's 
reputation and it too poses legal questions that can be fully 
reviewed at this time.  In addition, Seidman's and Bailey's 
petitions pose questions that are mainly legal in nature and 
judicial review now is likely to facilitate the appropriate 
enforcement of applicable law. 
 Because assessment of any civil penalties hinges on the 
Director's conclusion that Seidman and Bailey violated FIRREA, we 
believe review at this juncture serves the interest of judicial 
economy.  This case turns not on the civil penalties that are yet 
to be determined on the Director's remand to an ALJ but on the 
legality of the decisions the Director has already made.  The 
Director's decision "'imposes . . . obligation[s]'" and 
"'denies. . .  right[s].'"  Shea, 934 F.2d at 44-45.  Therefore, 
  
we have jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(h)(2) to review the 
Director's order removing Seidman from his position at Crestmont 
and banning him permanently from the thrift industry, and 
directing Bailey to stop engaging in unsafe or unsound 
practices.17 
 
 III.  Standard of Review 
 The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.A. 
§ 706(2) (West 1977), defines the scope of judicial review over 
the Director's findings and conclusions of law.  We must uphold 
the Director's order against Bailey and Seidman unless we 
determine that the Director has made an error of law or that his 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence on the whole 
record.  See Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 
1990).  Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion."  Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 
(1938).  Issues of law are subject to plenary review.  Dill v. 
INS, 773 F.2d 25, 28 (3d Cir. 1985).  In deciding legal issues, 
we must defer to an agency's consistent interpretation of the 
statute it administers unless it is "arbitrary and capricious,"  
                     
17
.  Our resolution of this issue of appealability is further 
supported by analogy to a district court proceeding in which one 
defendant had been enjoined from engaging in the banking business 
and a second defendant had been enjoined from engaging in unsafe 
and unsound banking practices.  The granting of the injunctions 
by the district court in this situation would be appealable under 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1) (West 1993).  We conclude that the same 
injunctive effect of the civil penalties imposed on Seidman and 
Bailey argues in favor of permitting this appeal. 
  
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  Nevertheless, when "bizarre" 
interpretations of a statute are made out of "regulatory zeal," 
deference is not appropriate.  See Wachtel v. OTS, 982 F.2d 581, 
585 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  Similarly, interpretations contrary to the 
plain meaning of the statute are unacceptable.  Elliot Coal 
Mining Co., Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d 616, 629 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Seidman's due process attack on the statute in question, 
the merits issue to which we first turn, is subject to plenary 
review.  United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 429 (1986). 
 
 IV.  Seidman's Due Process Challenge to the Statute 
 Seidman argues that 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e) violates due 
process because it fails to afford him a hearing before a fair 
and unbiased tribunal.  He says a sanction so severe should not 
be entrusted to a person who has the combined functions of 
investigation, prosecution and adjudication.  Although the 
Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires 
administrative agencies to be fair and unbiased, see In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 135-36 (1955), it has also held that the 
Constitution permits the investigative, prosecutorial and 
adjudicative roles to be combined in one agency.  See Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47, 52-53 (1975).  Agency administrators 
are presumed to be "'capable of judging a particular controversy 
fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.'"  Id. at 55 
(quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)).  
Seidman argues Withrow does not permit all three roles to be 
  
combined in one person who also has the power to find facts and 
judge credibility without even hearing the witnesses. 
 The Director of OTS has the power to authorize an 
investigation, to determine whether charges should be brought, to 
issue notice of charges proffered and then to decide them as to 
law and fact.  See 12 C.F.R. §§ 509.4, 509.18 (1993).  Although 
OTS charges are usually heard by an ALJ, "[t]he Director may, at 
any time during the pendency of a proceeding perform, direct the 
performance of, or waive performance of, any act which could be 
done or ordered by the [ALJ]."  Id. § 509.4.  The ultimate 
decision is entirely the Director's and he is free to disregard 
not only the ALJ's legal conclusions but also the ALJ's findings 
of fact, including findings on credibility.  See id. 
§ 509.5(b)(7) (". . . only the Director shall have the power to 
grant any motion to dismiss the proceeding or to decide any other 
motion that results in a final determination of the merits of the 
proceeding . . . ."); id. § 509.40 (1993). 
 In Murchison, the Supreme Court held that a statutory 
scheme which gave a state judge power to sit as a grand jury, 
compel testimony, charge perjury and try and convict the persons 
charged violated due process.  Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133-34.  In 
Withrow, however, the Court stated, "Murchison has not been 
understood to stand for the broad rule that the members of an 
administrative agency may not investigate the facts, institute 
proceedings, and then make the necessary adjudications."  
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 53.  In Withrow, the combination of 
functions under attack permitted Wisconsin's state board for the 
  
examination of physicians to conduct investigative proceedings, 
institute charges, hold a hearing and adjudicate the charges.  
Id. at 54.  The Supreme Court held that this combination of 
regulatory powers did not violate due process.  It stated:  
"[T]here was no more evidence of bias or the risk of bias or 
prejudgment than inhered in the very fact that the Board had 
investigated and would now adjudicate."  Id. (footnote omitted).  
The Supreme Court pointed out that the defendant and his counsel 
were permitted to be present throughout the investigation, 
counsel attended the hearings and counsel was aware of the facts 
presented to the board.  Id. at 55.  Ultimately, the Court 
required a showing of actual bias or at least a risk of bias and 
held neither was present under the Wisconsin scheme.  Id. 
 In United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union 
Local No. 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 
128 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 481 U.S. 
735 (1987), we held that the provisions of the Multiemployer 
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 governing procedure in 
administrative adjudications were unconstitutional because bias 
or a likelihood of bias is present when an agency's adjudicator 
has a fiduciary or fiscal stake in the decision.  Id. at 139-40.  
But see Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension 
Trust for S. California, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2276-78 (1993) (holding 
that even where an initial determination is made by a biased 
party, due process is met where there are provisions for a 
neutral de novo review and adjudication of all factual and legal 
issues).  Consistent with Withrow's requirement of bias, we held 
  
that the presumption that administrative decisionmakers are 
unbiased may be rebutted by a "'showing of conflict of interest 
or some other specific reason.'"  Id. at 138 (quoting Schweiker 
v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982)). 
 Seidman contends that Murchison, not Withrow, controls 
when the power of decision is vested in one individual instead of 
a multi-member board or commission.  His argument implies that 
bias is inherent in such a process because it permits a single 
person to act as prosecutor, investigator and adjudicator as to 
the severe sanctions of section 1818(e).  We think Withrow 
implies the contrary and actual bias or a likelihood of bias must 
appear if an otherwise valid administrative sanction is to be 
overturned because of a denial of due process.  Though in Withrow 
a board, not a single person, combined the functions which the 
Director of OTS possesses under section 1818(e)(1), we do not 
think that distinction is controlling.  In Withrow the Court 
stated: 
  The risk of bias or prejudgment in this 
sequence of functions has not been considered 
to be intolerably high or to raise a 
sufficiently great possibility that the 
adjudicators would be so psychologically 
wedded to their complaints that they would 
consciously or unconsciously avoid the 
appearance of having erred or changed 
position.  Indeed, just as there is no 
logical inconsistency between a finding of 
probable cause and an acquittal in a criminal 
proceeding, there is no incompatibility 
between the agency filing a complaint based 
on probable cause and a subsequent decision, 
when all the evidence is in, that there has 
been no violation of the statute. . . . 
 
  
  The initial charge or determination of 
probable cause and the ultimate adjudication 
have different bases and purposes.  The fact 
that the same agency makes them in tandem and 
that they relate to the same issues does not 
result in a procedural due process violation.  
Clearly, if the initial view of the facts 
based on the evidence derived from 
nonadversarial processes as a practical or 
legal matter foreclosed fair and effective 
consideration at a subsequent adversary 
hearing leading to the ultimate decision, a 
substantial due process question would be 
raised.  But in our view, that is not this 
case. 
 
 
  
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 57-58 (footnote omitted).18  Any interest 
the Director might have in sustaining his own charges is no 
different than the board had in Withrow.  Seidman has not shown 
bias or a likelihood of bias.19  His due process argument fails.  
We therefore turn to the substantive requirements of the statutes 
which Bailey and Seidman were charged with violating.  We begin 
with the charges against Bailey because their consideration will 
                     
18
.  Congress, however, has expressed concern over the exercise 
of the power to remove a banker from office and ban him or her 
from the industry: 
 
 [T]he power to suspend or remove an officer 
or director of a bank or savings and loan 
association is an extraordinary power, which 
can do great harm to the individual affected 
and to his institution and to the financial 
system as a whole.  It must be strictly 
limited and carefully guarded. 
 
  Accordingly, the committee adopted 
language which . . . imposes the further 
requirement that the violation or practice 
must be "one involving personal dishonesty on 
the part of [the] director or officer." 
 
  With this limitation, and with the 
opportunity given to seek judicial review of 
suspension or removal orders . . . the 
committee concluded that the danger of abuse 
of the power has been reduced to the minimum. 
 
S. Rep. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3532, 3539; see also 112 Cong. Rec. 24984 (1966) 
(remarks of Rep. Patman concerning possible agency abuse of 
"unsafe or unsound practice" provision). 
19
.  Seidman contends various OTS officials may be biased against 
him, see Brief of Petitioner Seidman at 11 n.12 (explaining 
adversarial history with OTS), but he points to no specific facts 
tending to show that Director Ryan, the decisionmaker, was 
biased. 
  
require us to analyze some of the same concepts that underlie the 
more serious charges against Seidman. 
 
 V.  The Charges Against Bailey 
 Section 1818(b)(1) prohibits unsafe and unsound 
practices.  OTS argues that Bailey's commitment to the Levine 
loan conflicts with Crestmont's policy of prohibiting purchase 
money loans on the security of real property in which a Crestmont 
officer or director had an interest.  An officer's violation of a 
banking institution's policy, however, is not enough to justify a 
cease and desist order under section 1818(b)(1).  While the 
statute gives the Director considerable discretion, it 
nevertheless requires substantial evidence showing that the 
violation of policy amounted to an unsafe and unsound practice. 
 Section 1818(b)(1) provides: 
 If, in the opinion of the appropriate Federal 
Banking Agency . . . any institution-
affiliated party . . . has engaged . . . in 
an unsafe or unsound practice in conducting 
the business of [a] depository institution, 
. . . the agency may issue and serve upon the 
. . . party a notice of charges in respect 
thereof. . . .  [I]f upon the record made at 
. . . [a] hearing, the agency shall find that 
any . . . unsafe or unsound practice 
specified in the notice of charges has been 
established, the agency may issue and serve 
upon . . . the institution-affiliated party 
an order to cease and desist from any such 
. . . practice. 
 
 
12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(b)(1).20 
                     
20
.  Bailey and Seidman are institution-affiliated parties.  See 
12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(u)(1) (West 1989). 
  
 Because the statute itself does not define an unsafe or 
unsound practice, courts have sought help in the legislative 
history.  See, e.g., Northwest Nat'l Bank v. United States, 917 
F.2d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 1990); Gulf Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).  In hearings before Congress 
prior to its adoption in the Financial Institutions Supervisory 
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695 (1966) John Horne, Chairman of 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FLHBB"), OTS's predecessor, 
testified: 
 Generally speaking, an "unsafe or unsound 
practice" embraces any action, or lack of 
action, which is contrary to generally 
accepted standards of prudent operation, the 
possible consequences of which, if continued, 
would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to 
an institution, its shareholders, or the 
agencies administering the insurance funds. 
 
 
Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966: Hearings on 
S. 3158 and S. 3695 Before the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (memorandum submitted by 
John Horne) (citations omitted).  Thus, courts have generally 
interpreted the phrase "unsafe or unsound practice" as a flexible 
concept which gives the administering agency the ability to adapt 
to changing business problems and practices in the regulation of 
the banking industry.  See Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the 
Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The phrase 'unsafe 
or unsound banking practice' is widely used in the regulatory 
statutes and in case law, and one of the purposes of the banking 
  
acts is clearly to commit the progressive definition and 
eradication of such practices to the expertise of the appropriate 
regulatory agencies."). 
 Among the specific acts that may constitute an unsafe 
and unsound practice are "paying excessive dividends, 
disregarding a borrower's ability to repay, careless control of 
expenses, excessive advertising, and inadequate liquidity."  Gulf 
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 264.  In Gulf Federal, the 
court had to decide whether a bank's breach of contract was an 
unsafe or unsound practice that justified an FHLBB order to cease 
and desist.  Id. at 262.  The FHLBB concluded that the bank's 
potential liability for breach and possible "loss of public 
confidence in the institution" meant the breach was an unsafe and 
unsound practice that authorized the agency to order the bank to 
perform its contract.  Id. at 264.  The court disagreed and held 
that a breach of contract is not an unsafe or unsound practice 
that threatens a bank's financial soundness.  Id.  The court 
expressly rejected FHLBB's conclusion that liability for breach 
and consequent loss of public confidence in the bank's 
willingness to honor its commitments give rise to an unsafe or 
unsound practice that authorized a cease and desist order.  Id.  
It stated:  
 Such potential "risks" bear only the most 
remote relationship to [the bank's] financial 
integrity and the government's insurance 
risk. . . .  We fail to see how the [FHLBB] 
can safeguard [the bank's] finances by making 
definite and immediate an injury which is, at 
worst, contingent and remote. 
 
  
  Approving intervention under the 
[FHLBB's] "loss of public confidence" 
rationale would result in open-ended 
supervision. . . .  The [FHLBB's] rationale 
would permit it to decide, not that the 
public has lost confidence in [the bank's] 
financial soundness, but that the public may 
lose confidence in the fairness of the 
association's contracts with its customers.  
If the [FHLBB] can act to enforce the 
public's standard of fairness in interpreting 
contracts, the [FHLBB] becomes the monitor of 
every activity of the association in its role 
of proctor for public opinion.  This departs 
entirely from the congressional concept of 
acting to preserve the financial integrity of 
its members. 
 
 
Id. at 264-65 (footnote omitted). 
 In Northwest National Bank the court upheld the 
Comptroller of the Currency's ("Comptroller's") conclusion that 
evidence showing failure to maintain an adequate loan to loss 
reserve and inadequate capital, together with deficient loan 
administration, established unsafe or unsound banking practices.  
Northwest Nat'l Bank, 917 F.2d at 1113-14.  The court agreed with 
FHLBB that the bank's failure to maintain adequate reserves and 
capital was an unsafe or unsound practice.  Id. at 1115.  The 
court defined the phrase "unsafe and unsound banking practices" 
in general terms similar to those that appear in the legislative 
history:  "Unsafe and unsound banking practices are . . . 
'conduct deemed contrary to accepted standards of banking 
operations which might result in abnormal risk or loss to a 
banking institution or shareholder.'"  Id. (quoting First Nat'l 
Bank of Eden v. Department of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 n.2 
  
(8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)).  The court in Northwest National 
Bank decided that the poor state of the bank's loan portfolio and 
the insufficient level of its capital and reserves permitted an 
inference that unsafe lending practices had occurred.  Id.  
Accordingly, it upheld the Comptroller's finding that the bank 
had engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices.  Id. at 
1115-16; see also First Nat'l Bank of Eden, 568 F.2d at 611 
(upholding Comptroller's issuance of cease and desist order for 
unsafe and unsound banking practices when record showed 
accumulation of unsafe assets, inadequate internal controls and 
auditing procedures, lack of credit information on certain bank 
investments in violation of federal regulations and payment of 
excessive bonuses to bank officers). 
 In MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 
F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991), the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve concluded that MCorp's failure to provide capital 
to its subsidiary banks was an unsafe or unsound practice and 
entered a cease and desist order directing MCorp to transfer 
assets to its banking subsidiaries.  MCorp Fin., Inc., 900 F.2d 
at 862.  On review, the court of appeals concluded that Congress 
had failed to provide a clear definition of "unsafe or unsound 
practice."  Id. at 862.  Limited by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but 
relying on Gulf Federal Savings & Loan Association, the court 
concluded that the Board of Governors' order directing MCorp to 
transfer assets to its troubled subsidiaries was itself contrary 
  
to "'generally accepted standard[] of prudent operation.'"  Id. 
at 863 (quoting Gulf Federal Sav., 651 F.2d at 254).  "Such a 
transfer of funds would require MCorp to disregard its own 
corporation's separate status; it would amount to a wasting of 
the holding company's assets in violation of its duty to its 
shareholders."  Id. 
 We think at least one common element of an unsafe or 
unsound banking practice relating to the health of the 
institution can be deduced from these cases and the legislative 
history.  The imprudent act must pose an abnormal risk to the 
financial stability of the banking institution.  This is the 
standard that the case law and legislative history indicates we 
should apply in judging whether an unsafe or unsound practice has 
occurred. 
 With this in mind, we turn to the specific imprudent 
acts OTS charges against Bailey.  They are: 
 (a) failing to disclose Seidman's interest in 
Fulton Street Associates to the Senior Loan 
Committee . . ., (b) approving the Levine 
Loan without presenting the loan for review 
to Crestmont's Senior Loan Committee . . ., 
and (c) approving the Levine Loan even though 
Bailey knew that Seidman had an interest in 
Fulton Street Associates. 
 
 
Bailey App. at 20.  Only one of them has any potential for 
causing Crestmont loss--Bailey's premature issuance of the 
commitment letter.21   
                     
21
.  The first two grounds relied upon by the Director--a failure 
to disclose Seidman's interest in FSA to the Senior Loan 
Committee and Bailey's approval of the loan without submitting it 
  
 When Bailey issued the commitment letter, he made 
Crestmont responsible for the Levine loan.  He did this despite 
the fact that Seidman had not extricated himself from the FSA 
partnership or from the UJB guarantee.  When Levine accepted the 
commitment, Crestmont remained ineligible to make the loan.  
Thus, Crestmont became responsible for the loan despite the 
potential illegal conflict.  We think this act was imprudent.  
Although all parties testified that their understanding was that 
the loan would not go through absent Seidman's complete 
withdrawal, Bailey had nevertheless obligated Crestmont to a loan 
it might not be able to make.  Obligating one's institution to 
transactions that might be illegal is not in accord with 
"generally accepted standards of prudent operation."  See MCorp 
Fin., Inc., 900 F.2d at 862.  After Levine accepted the 
commitment letter, Crestmont either had to make the loan, breach 
the agreement to make it or place the loan with another 
institution regardless of Seidman's position.  Although, as it 
turned out, Crestmont was able to place the loan without incident 
or loss, we recognize that a risk was present when Bailey issued 
the commitment.  Obliging an institution to choose between 
(..continued) 
to the Senior Loan Committee--were not material to Bailey's act 
of approving the loan and issuing a commitment letter.  The 
record establishes that all the members of the Senior Loan 
Committee were fully aware of Seidman's interest and had agreed 
that the Levine loan was not to be approved until Seidman fully 
disassociated himself from FSA.  Moreover, reliance on the 
omission of Seidman's interest on the Credit Summary form is 
misplaced.  Undisputed testimony supported Bailey's claim that 
the entry on the form referred to an affiliated party's interest 
in the borrower.  See supra note 5. 
  
covering fluctuations in the interest rate, engaging in an 
illegal transaction or breaching a binding agreement is not 
prudent. 
 Imprudence standing alone, however, is insufficient to 
constitute an unsafe or unsound practice.  A cease and desist 
order is designed to prevent actions that if repeated would carry 
a potential for serious loss.  Although issuance of even this 
single commitment exposed Crestmont to some potential risk of 
loss, that potential risk did not begin to approach the abnormal 
risk involved in Northwest National Bank, where the bank was 
exposed to a serious threat to financial stability by its general 
failure to monitor its loans adequately and to maintain adequate 
reserves and capital.  The potential loss to which Bailey 
subjected Crestmont is rather like that present in Gulf Federal.  
Contingent, remote harms that could ultimately result in "minor 
financial loss[es]" to the institution are insufficient to pose 
the danger that warrants cease and desist proceedings.  Gulf Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 264.  Though it is not 
particularly onerous to require a loan officer to satisfy himself 
that the institution may legally make a loan before the 
commitment is issued, we cannot conclude that the commitment 
Bailey authorized posed such an abnormal risk that Crestmont's 
financial stability was threatened. 
 We hold that Bailey's approval of the Levine loan and 
the commitment he issued on behalf of Crestmont in violation of 
its policies, while imprudent, did not pose an abnormal risk to 
Crestmont's financial stability and therefore was not an unsafe 
  
or unsound practice within the meaning of section 1818(b).  
Accordingly, we will grant Bailey's petition for review and 
vacate the part of the Director's order pertaining to Bailey. 
 
 VI.  The Charges Against Seidman 
 Courts have recognized that the power to remove a bank 
officer is an extraordinary power that should be carefully 
exercised in strict accordance with the law.  Cf. Manges v. Camp, 
474 F.2d 97, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1973).  Accordingly, we might 
expect that the statute under which OTS sought the far more 
serious sanction of Seidman's removal from office and his 
permanent prohibition from participation in the thrift industry, 
12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e), requires elements additional to those that 
justify the lesser sanction of a cease and desist order.  We are 
not disappointed.  By requiring a three part conjunctive test in 
section 1818(e)(1), Congress has imposed significant additional 
conditions before a banker can be deprived of his office and 
permanently barred from banking.  Thus, before an agency 
regulating a banking institution can impose this ultimate 
administrative sanction on any banker, it must show by 
substantial evidence that:  (1) the banker has committed an 
unlawful act; (2) the act has either an adverse effect on the 
regulated institution or its depositors or confers a benefit on 
the actor and (3) the act is accompanied by a culpable state of 
mind.22  See Oberstar v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 494, 500 (8th Cir. 1993).  
                     
22
.  The full text of section 1818(e)(1) is: 
 
  
(..continued) 
 (1) . . .  Whenever the appropriate Federal 
banking agency determines that-- 
 
  (A) any institution-affiliated party 
has, directly or indirectly-- 
 
   (i) violated-- 
 
    (I) any law or 
regulation; . . . 
 
   (ii) engaged or participated in any 
unsafe or unsound practice in 
connection with any insured 
depository institution or business 
institution; or 
 
   (iii) committed or engaged in any 
act, omission, or practice which 
constitutes a breach of such 
party's fiduciary duty; 
 
  (B) by reason of the violation, 
practice, or breach described in any 
clause of subparagraph (A)-- 
 
   (i) such insured depository 
institution or business institution 
has suffered or will probably 
suffer financial loss or other 
damage; 
 
   (ii) the interest of the insured 
depository institution's depositors 
have been or could be prejudiced; 
or  
 
   (iii) such party has received 
financial gain or other benefit by 
reason of such violation, practice, 
or breach; and  
 
  (C) such violation, practice, or 
breach-- 
 
   (i) involves personal dishonesty on 
the part of such party; or 
 
  
The acts come in three varieties.  The effects also divide into 
three subclasses, but there are only two kinds of culpable mental 
states.  Under section 1818(e)(1), at least one of the prohibited 
acts, accompanied by at least one of the three prohibited effects 
and at least one of the two specified culpable states of mind, 
must be established by substantial evidence on the whole record 
before the regulatory agency can properly remove a person from 
office and ban him from the banking or thrift industries.  Id. 
 The Director concluded five separate charges warranting 
the sanction of removal and prohibition were proven against 
Seidman:  (1) acting to gain release from the UJB loan; (2) 
failing to notify Crestmont's Senior Loan committee of his 
interest in FSA and the Boonton project; (3) destroying material 
information during the investigation; (4) giving misleading 
testimony in a deposition; and (5) instructing a material witness 
to withhold evidence.  We will examine the record as to each to 
see if the evidence relevant to each meets the statutory 
requirements we have just described. 
 
 A.  Seidman's Release From His Guarantee on the UJB Loan 
 1. Did Seidman Violate "Any Law or Regulation" 
  in Seeking the Release? 
(..continued) 
   (ii) demonstrates willful or 
continuing disregard by such party 
for the safety or soundness of such 
insured depository institution or 
business institution. 
 
12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(1) (West 1989). 
  
 On the first charge, we begin with the particular acts 
described in section 1818(e)(1)(A).  If Seidman's effort to 
secure a release from the UJB guarantee is not among the three 
kinds of acts section 1818(e)(1)(A) prohibits, we need not 
consider any of the particular effects section 1818(e)(1)(B) 
specifies or either of the culpable states of mind section 
1818(e)(1)(C) describes because the elements of act, effect and 
state of mind are conjunctive.  Oberstar, 987 F.2d at 500.  Each 
must be established by substantial evidence before the Director 
may issue an order of removal and prohibition under the statute. 
 OTS contends Seidman acted in violation of "law or 
regulation" under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I) when he and Risko 
took steps to secure Seidman's release from his guaranty of FSA's 
indebtedness to UJB.  The ALJ concluded that Seidman violated 12 
C.F.R. § 563.43 in securing his release from the UJB guarantee.23  
Section 563.43 made it improper for a savings association to 
"[m]ake any loan to . . . any third party on the security of real 
property purchased from any affiliated person of such 
association, unless the property was a single-family dwelling 
owned and occupied by the affiliated person as his or her 
principal residence."  12 C.F.R. § 563.43(c)(1) (1991) (since 
repealed).24  Seidman argues section 563.43(c)(1) does not apply 
because it expressly requires consummation of a loan, and 
                     
23
.  In his opinion the Director does not expressly find a 
violation of section 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I) on this ground, but his 
acceptance of the ALJ's recommendation implies he did. 
24
.  See supra note 8. 
  
Crestmont never granted any prohibited loan.  We agree with 
Seidman.25 
 The Director also held, however, that Seidman violated 
12 C.F.R. § 571.7, and that violation met section 
1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I)'s requirement of a prohibited act because it 
was a violation of a "regulation."  Seidman argues that section 
571.7 is a policy statement, not a regulation, and therefore any 
violation of it did not meet section 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I)'s 
requirement.  Section 571.7 is expressly labeled a "Statement of 
Policy" and reads, in relevant part: 
 [E]ach director, officer, or other affiliated 
person of a savings association has a 
fundamental duty to avoid placing himself or 
herself in a position which creates, or which 
leads to or could lead to, a conflict of 
interest or appearance of a conflict of 
interest. . . . 
 
 
12 C.F.R. § 571.7(b) (1993).  OTS's predecessor, FHLBB, 
consistently drew a distinction between "general statements of 
policy" and substantive regulations.  See 12 C.F.R. §§ 508.11, 
508.12, 508.14 (1989).26  The enactment of FIRREA does not remove 
this distinction because the APA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b)(A) (West 
1977), requires more exacting procedures of notice and comment 
for the promulgation of rules that have the force of law than it 
                     
25
.  Indeed, in his brief and argument on Seidman's petition for 
review, the Director appears to place little, if any, reliance on 
this regulation. 
26
.  After enactment of FIRREA, OTS amended the old FHLBB 
regulations.  The version applicable to Seidman's case, however, 
is the FHLBB version. 
  
does for statements of policy.  A regulated person's failure to 
follow the guidance of a policy statement is not sanctionable 
under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I) unless it is also shown that 
the failure to follow the policy violated some specific statute, 
rule or regulation that has the force of law: 
 [C]ourts are in general agreement that 
interpretive rules simply state what the 
administrative agency thinks the statute 
means, and only "remind" affected parties of 
existing duties.  In contrast, a substantive 
or legislative rule, pursuant to properly 
delegated authority, has the force of law, 
and creates new law or imposes new rights or 
duties. 
 
 
Jerri's Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm., 874 
F.2d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also FLRA 
v. Dep't of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc); 
Northwest Nat'l Bank, 917 F.2d at 1117.  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has observed: 
 A general statement of policy . . . does not 
establish a binding norm.  It is not finally 
determinative of the issues or rights to 
which it is addressed.  When the agency 
applies the policy in a particular situation, 
it must be prepared to defend it, and cannot 
claim that the matter is foreclosed by the 
prior policy statement. 
 
 
Guardian Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 666 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 FHLBB issued section 571.7 as a caution against the 
risk that is added when an affiliated person like Seidman has a 
personal stake in a business transaction his savings institution 
  
is considering, a risk inherent in self-dealing.  See generally 
First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1980).  
The FHLBB first announced section 571.7 in 1968 as a policy 
without giving interested persons any opportunity for comment.  
See 33 Fed. Reg. 16,382 (1968) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 571.1).  
In 1975, the FHLBB published a request for comment on a number of 
conflict of interest proposals that had been adopted on 
November 19, 1970.  It included section 571.7.  See 35 Fed. Reg. 
12,216, 18,038 (1975).  Nevertheless, section 571.7 continued to 
appear in a section of C.F.R. entitled "Statements of Policy."  
Accordingly, Seidman argues it is wrong to take away a person's 
livelihood under a provision promulgated, codified and described 
as a policy statement rather than as a rule or regulation having 
the force of law. 
 In Northwest National Bank the bank was charged with 
violating 12 C.F.R. § 7.3025 (1987).  Northwest Nat'l Bank, 917 
F.2d at 1116.  The court concluded that the rule was legislative 
in nature because it "clearly purports to create new substantive 
requirements."  Id. at 1117.  It considered several factors, 
including the text of the rule and the procedure the agency had 
used to promulgate it, in deciding whether it was "interpretive" 
or "legislative" in nature.  Id. at 1116-17.  The rule's 
classification as "interpretive" was an important but not 
dispositive factor.  Id. 
 The legislative rule the court in Northwest National 
Bank considered is materially different from section 571.7, which 
imposes no specific substantive requirements.  Moreover, 
  
Northwest National Bank's failure to follow 12 C.F.R. § 7.3025 
plainly led to a violation of the statute itself.  Id. at 1116 
("The Comptroller found Northwest in violation of [the 
regulation] and thereby in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 29."). 
 In addition, the text of section 571.7 does not support 
OTS's position.  Section 571.7 has not changed since it was first 
published as a policy statement.  OTS has since promulgated 
regulations with the force of law prohibiting specific conflicts 
of interest.  They would be redundant if section 571.7's general 
statement independently has the force of law.  See, e.g., 12 
C.F.R. §§ 563.40, 563.41, 563.43 (1993). 
 Considering the Northwest National Bank factors 
together, we hold section 571.1(b), whose text, title and 
codification as a policy statement have never changed, is just 
that--a policy statement, not a regulation.27  Congress and the 
agencies that regulate lending institutions have specifically 
prohibited particular acts as conflicts of interest in statutes, 
rules and regulations that plainly do have the force of law.28  
Congress and the regulators have shown that they know how to 
                     
27
.  We need not and do not decide that FIRREA does not give OTS 
the authority to expand the duty of loyalty officers of banking 
corporations OTS regulates owe their institutions from actual 
conflicts of interest to appearances of conflict, but we do hold 
that if it wishes to assert such authority its intent to do so 
must be more clearly expressed than it is in section 571.7. 
28
.  Nothing about policy statements in general nor section 
571(b) in particular would indicate to persons who might be 
affected by them that violation of the policy against apparent 
conflicts could subject them to an order banning them from the 
trade or profession they work in. 
  
define specific conduct that gives rise to an illegal conflict of 
interest.  We think the sweeping language of section 571.7(b) 
indicates it is no more than a statement of policy that a 
director of a banking institution, like Seidman, should use as a 
guide for personal conduct, not a rule whose violation triggers 
the severe penalty section 1818(e) imposes.  Accordingly, we 
reject the Director's conclusion that section 571.7(b)'s 
"Statement of Policy" is a "regulation or law" within the meaning 
of section 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I). 
 
 2. Did Seidman Engage in an Unsafe or Unsound 
  Practice by Seeking the Release? 
 Because Seidman did not act in violation of a law or 
regulation as required by section 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I) when he 
sought the release, we next consider whether by doing so he 
engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice under section 
1818(e)(1)(A)(ii).  The Director summarily concluded that 
Seidman's conduct in seeking a release from the UJB guarantee 
without informing the Board or the Senior Loan Committee of his 
interest in FSA, the second charge against him, constituted an 
unsafe or unsound practice.  OTS urges us to affirm this holding. 
 As stated previously, 
 an "unsafe or unsound practice" embraces any 
action, or lack of action, which is contrary 
to generally accepted standards of prudent 
operation, the possible consequences of 
which, if continued, would be abnormal risk 
of loss or damage to an institution, its 
shareholders, or the agencies administering 
the insurance funds. 
 
 
  
MCorp Fin., Inc., 900 F.2d at 862 (quotation omitted).  An unsafe 
or unsound practice has two components:  (1) an imprudent act (2) 
that places an abnormal risk of financial loss or damage on a 
banking institution.  See supra Part V.  OTS contends that 
Seidman's conduct in seeking a release from his UJB guarantee and 
failing to inform the Board or the Senior Loan Committee of his 
interest meets these requirements. 
 OTS and the Director equate the imprudence component of 
an unsafe or unsound practice with a breach of the fiduciary duty 
of due care, once called the "prudent man rule" and now more 
often described as the "business judgment" rule.  See Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA") § 8.30 comment (1992).  
In its brief, OTS asserts "[t]he prudent operation of Crestmont 
certainly requires that its directors and officers comply with 
OTS regulations concerning conflicts of interest as well as 
Crestmont's own policy governing conflicts."  Appellee Brief at 
31.29 
 While the same act may be both an unsafe or unsound 
practice under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii) and a breach of a 
fiduciary duty under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(iii), we hesitate to 
make one a proxy for the other.30  If OTS seeks to prove a 
                     
29
.  OTS also relies on Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 
1990), but that case dealt with self-dealing, a breach of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty, not the fiduciary duty of care. 
30
.  Congress obviously thought the concepts were distinct enough 
to require separate specification in section 1818(e)(1)(A).  
Here, we need not consider the details of any overlap between 
acts that are unsafe or unsound practices and those that are 
breaches of fiduciary duty because we apply different tests to 
determine which category applies to any particular act.  It is 
  
violation of section 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii), it must satisfy the 
definition of an unsafe or unsound practice.  Conversely, if OTS 
wishes to prove a violation of section 1818(e)(1)(A)(iii), it 
must do so under the standards that define a fiduciary's duty.  
Our present inquiry is only whether the first charge against 
Seidman concerning his successful efforts to obtain a release 
from his guarantee of FSA's obligations to UJB was an unsafe and 
unsound practice.  So considered, we conclude Seidman's attempt 
to secure a release was not an unsafe and unsound banking 
practice with respect to Crestmont.  OTS not only placed Seidman 
in the position of selecting between his business life and his 
banking life but also compelled him to deprive Crestmont of 
potentially desirable loans.  OTS told Seidman he had to 
relinquish his outside interests and disengage himself from the 
obligations he had incurred while a partner in FSA and then, when 
he did so, charged him with an unsafe and unsound practice.  
Seidman's successful effort to secure a release from his 
guarantee was potentially beneficial to Crestmont by giving it an 
added source of desirable loans.  The record does not support a 
conclusion that Seidman's attempts to extricate himself from the 
UJB guarantee were contrary to accepted banking practices for 
persons acting on behalf of Crestmont. 
(..continued) 
important, however, in deciding cases and in imposing sanctions 
to separately compare the act under consideration with all the 
elements of each category.  The Director's failure to do so is a 
source of many of the problems and much of the confusion in this 
case. 
  
 Even if we were to conclude that Seidman behaved 
imprudently in seeking the release, OTS would still have to show 
that his actions created an abnormal risk of financial loss for 
Crestmont.  See supra Part V.  Unable to identify any specific 
harm to Crestmont, OTS argues, "if directors are free to make 
choices for the institutions they control based on the personal 
benefit that would result from their choice there would be an 
inherent risk that the interests of the depositors and the 
institution would take a back seat to the personal interest of 
the director."  Appellee App. at 31.  OTS again fails to 
recognize any distinction between the separate requirements of 
section 1818(e).  Its argument conflates the act of engaging in 
an unsafe practice with the prohibited effect of personal gain. 
Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii) with id. 
§ 1818(e)(1)(B)(iii).  This record does not show that Seidman's 
attempt to obtain relief from his guarantee and free Crestmont 
from OTS's prohibition against end-user financing on FSA's 
Boonton development created an abnormal risk of loss or damage to 
Crestmont.  We therefore turn to section 1818(e)(1)(A)(iii). 
 
 3.  Did Seidman Violate Any Fiduciary Duty 
 In Seeking the Release? 
 In a final attempt to demonstrate that Seidman's 
release from the UJB guarantee was an "act" under section 
1818(e)(1)(A) and therefore one of the three elements needed to 
justify a removal and prohibition order, OTS argues that the 
Director correctly concluded that Seidman's efforts to secure his 
  
release constituted self-dealing and violated his fiduciary duty 
of loyalty to Crestmont under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(iii).31  As a 
member of the board and an officer of Crestmont, Seidman did owe 
a duty of loyalty to Crestmont.  Section 8.42 of the RMBCA 
states: 
  (a) An officer with discretionary 
authority shall discharge his duties under 
that authority: 
 
   (1) in good faith; 
 
   (2) with the care an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances; 
and 
 
   (3) in a manner he reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of 
the corporation. 
 
 
RMBCA § 8.42 (1992).  Common law also imposes on a director a 
duty of loyalty to the corporation served.  See Fleishacker v. 
Blum, 109 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 665 
(1940).  The duty of loyalty includes a duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest.  See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306, 310-11 
(1939).   
 In In re Bush, OTS AP 91-16, 1991 OTS DD LEXIS 2 
(April 18, 1991), the Director discussed both a director's duty 
                     
31
.  The Director also concluded that Seidman breached his duty 
of candor when he failed to inform the Senior Loan Committee or 
the Crestmont Board of his interest in FSA before the Levine loan 
commitment.  This argument is addressed infra at Part VI.B.  The 
Director did not conclude either of these acts violated Seidman's 
fiduciary duty of care, only the duty of loyalty. 
  
of loyalty and the initial inquiry of whether a director has a 
conflicting interest in a transaction: 
  A fundamental component of the fiduciary 
duties of directors in every jurisdiction, 
however, is that directors owe a duty of 
loyalty to the institution they serve.  This 
duty prohibits directors from engaging in 
transactions that involve conflicts of 
interest with the institution. . . . 
 
   *  *  * 
 
  The threshold inquiry in assessing 
whether a director violated his duty of 
loyalty is whether the director has a 
conflicting interest in the transaction.  
Directors are considered to be "interested" 
if they either "appear on both sides of a 
transaction []or expect to derive any 
personal financial benefit from it in the 
sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a 
benefit which devolves upon the corporation 
or all stockholders generally." 
 
 
In re Bush, OTS AP 91-16 at 11, 15-16, 1991 OTS DD LEXIS at *18, 
*21 (footnote and citations omitted).  The RMBCA defines a 
director's conflicting interest transaction as "a transaction 
effected or proposed to be effected by the corporation . . . 
respecting which a director of the corporation has a conflicting 
interest."  RMBCA § 8.60(2) (1992).  Perhaps because this 
definition tautologically defines the defined in terms of itself, 
the Commissioners, in commentary, observed that "[t]o constitute 
a director's conflicting interest transaction, there must first 
be a transaction by the corporation, its subsidiary, or 
controlled entity in which the director has a financial 
interest."  RMBCA § 8.6 comment 2(1) (emphasis added). 
  
 As Seidman points out, Crestmont never granted any loan 
secured by property whose sale could reduce Seidman's obligation 
on his guarantee or UJB's exposure on its loan to FSA, nor did 
Seidman ever promise anyone that Crestmont would make such loans 
in exchange for his release.  OTS clearly suspected that Seidman 
promised UJB Crestmont's favorable consideration for end-user 
loans on FSA properties in return for UJB's release.  Suspicion 
is not enough, however, and OTS's suspicion that Seidman had 
promised he would use his position at Crestmont to insure end-
user financing on the FSA project is not supported by substantial 
evidence.  Risko's letter does not show any such quid pro quo in 
either of its versions.  Indeed, if we accept the Director's 
finding that Seidman prepared the original draft, the version of 
the evidence most favorable to OTS, it appears that Risko took 
pains to make it clear to UJB that no quid pro quo was promised 
in the version Risko finally sent to UJB without any objection 
from Seidman.  The evidence on this record is just as consistent 
with a finding that UJB released Seidman because Crestmont was a 
good prospect for the end-user financing it needed to reduce its 
own exposure on a worrisome project as it is with the conclusion 
that UJB granted the release in exchange for Seidman's unlawful 
promise to use his influence to obtain Crestmont's approval of 
loans that would reduce its exposure on FSA's Boonton project and 
to favor end-user loans on the Levine property or any other 
property in the Boonton project.32 
                     
32
.  Additional evidence which supports a conclusion that UJB's 
recognition that Crestmont could not lawfully supply end-user 
  
 OTS's position puts Seidman in a "Catch-22."  If he 
remained liable on his guarantee to UJB, Crestmont would be 
unable to consider potentially profitable end-user loans on the 
Boonton project; but when Seidman acted to secure a release from 
the guarantee, he subjected himself to removal from Crestmont's 
Board.  The only way Seidman could avoid the conflict of interest 
that OTS saw in his relation to FSA was to extricate himself from 
the FSA partnership and all the entanglements it entailed, 
including the guarantee.  This record shows that this is what he 
did.  Moreover, when we consider the whole record, as we must, we 
see substantial evidence that Seidman did not act as he did to 
benefit himself at Crestmont's expense, but rather because he 
wished to eliminate outside interests that could have a potential 
for conflict with Crestmont's interests.33  Corporate law imposes 
(..continued) 
loans on the Boonton project unless UJB released Seidman's 
guarantee motivated its approval of the release.  It shows that 
the release was good business for UJB, Seidman and Crestmont 
because it increased the pool of potential lenders in a tight 
market and gave Crestmont an opportunity to acquire good loans on 
their merits. 
33
.  The situation would be entirely different if OTS had shown 
that Seidman had committed Crestmont to underwrite risky loans in 
exchange for his personal release, but there is no evidence that 
the Levine loan or any other end-user financing Crestmont 
considered was more risky than any other loan Crestmont might 
grant, nor is there evidence that Seidman promised to look 
favorably on any Boonton loan.  Until OTS decided loans could not 
be made on property developed with loans which a thrift director 
has guaranteed, Seidman was seeking only to withdraw from FSA as 
a partner against a promise of indemnity from the partner who was 
acquiring Seidman's interest.  This record shows Seidman was 
trying to meet OTS regulations rather than trying secretly to 
seek a release from his own potential liability at Crestmont's 
expense. 
  
a duty of loyalty not because the conflict appears improper to a 
third party but to "'prevent[] a conflict of opposing interest in 
the minds of fiduciaries, whose duty it is to act solely for the 
benefit of their beneficiaries."  FSLIC v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 
899, 904 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Restatement of Restitution 
§ 197 comment c (1937)) (emphasis added).  This record shows 
Seidman acted to avoid that conflict, not because of it. 
 We do not think every appearance of wrongdoing 
justifies the sanction of removal and prohibition.  Rather, we 
believe such a drastic sanction should require some evidence of 
actual misconduct or evidence from which a reasonable person 
acquainted with the facts could conclude there was misconduct.  
Here, Crestmont never made any loan to an end-user on the FSA 
project, and Seidman told Bailey to stop considering any loans in 
which Seidman had an interest before OTS began its investigation.  
Seidman did so as soon as he realized he could not persuade OTS 
that his guarantee did not matter.  Seidman's earlier attempts to 
persuade OTS to the contrary were not improper.  Viewed as a 
whole, we think this record contains substantial evidence that 
Seidman acted to further the interests of Crestmont, not just his 
own, when he attempted to obtain a release from his guarantee, 
and therefore his actions did not constitute a breach of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty contained in section 
1818(e)(1)(A)(iii). 
 In summary, we hold Seidman's conduct in seeking a 
release from the UJB guarantee did not violate any "law or 
regulation" under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I) or constitute an 
  
"unsafe or unsound" practice under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii) or a 
breach of fiduciary duty under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(iii).  To 
the extent the Director relied on Seidman's conduct of seeking a 
release from his guarantee of FSA's indebtedness to UJB to 
support the order of removal and prohibition, the Director erred. 
 
 B.  Seidman's Failure to Remind Crestmont's Board 
     or Senior Loan Committee of His Interest in FSA 
 Next, we consider whether the Director erred in 
concluding that Seidman's failure to remind Crestmont's Board or 
Senior Loan Committee of his interest in FSA constitutes an act 
under section 1818(e)(1)(A) that could support an order of 
removal and prohibition.  The record shows Seidman had already 
made his interest in the Boonton project known through disclosure 
on the conflict forms he filed with Crestmont.  The Director, 
however, thought Seidman had to bring his interest in FSA to the 
specific attention of Crestmont's Board or Senior Loan Committee 
before it began processing the proposed loan to Levine.  Neither 
OTS nor the Director points to any general regulation or 
Crestmont policy that imposes any duty on Seidman more specific 
than his general duty to disclose his interest in FSA to 
Crestmont.34  OTS does not cite any law or regulation requiring 
                     
34
.  A fiduciary's duty of candor is encompassed within the duty 
of loyalty.  The duty of candor requires "corporate fiduciaries 
[to] 'disclose all material information relevant to corporate 
decisions from which they may derive a personal benefit.'"  In re 
Bush, OTS AP 91-16 at 19, 1991 OTS DD LEXIS at 19 (quoting Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 
1989)). 
  
Seidman to remind the Board or Senior Loan Committee of what he 
had already disclosed to them, nor does OTS argue Seidman's 
failure to repeat his disclosure constitutes an unsafe or unsound 
practice.  Even if the Director were technically correct in 
finding that Seidman breached a fiduciary duty of candor when he 
failed specifically to remind the Senior Loan Committee of his 
interest in FSA each time the Levine loan came before the 
Committee, that breach would not be material because the record 
plainly shows that all three of the members of the Senior Loan 
Committee, Bailey, Seidman and arguably McClellan,35 were fully 
aware of Seidman's interest in FSA.36  Therefore, the Director 
erred when he decided Seidman breached his fiduciary duty of 
candor in not specifically reminding the Board or the Senior Loan 
                     
35
.  Before the ALJ, McClellan testified that as President of 
Crestmont he would review conflict of interest disclosure forms 
filed by relevant Crestmont personnel.  It is further undisputed 
that Seidman had disclosed his FSA interest on the most recent 
two conflict of interest forms filed prior to the Levine loan.  
Thus, McClellan had imputed knowledge of Seidman's interest in 
FSA. 
36
.  There is another reason why a renewed specific disclosure to 
the Senior Loan Committee was not material to Crestmont's 
decision to grant or deny the Levine loan.  Crestmont's internal 
regulations do not require the Senior Loan Committee to review 
applications for loans of less than $500,000 unless they are for 
loans to "affiliated parties."  The Levine application did not 
exceed $500,000, and the evidence on this record indicates that 
Crestmont would not have granted the loan if Seidman had not 
completed his withdrawal from FSA.  Crestmont's President 
McClellan testified that it was the understanding in other 
similar situations that Seidman would withdraw his interest 
before Crestmont made any loans.  See Bailey App. at 191.  While 
Bailey should not have issued a commitment letter before Seidman 
completed his formal withdrawal from FSA, there is no evidence 
showing that Seidman anticipated Bailey's premature action. 
  
Committee about his interest in FSA, and this second charge 
cannot be grounds for a removal and prohibition order under 
section 1818(e)(1)(A)(iii). 
 
 C.  Seidman's Attempt to Hinder the OTS Investigation 
 Finally, we must consider whether Seidman's actions 
during the pendency of the OTS investigation support removal and 
prohibition.  The Director found Seidman lied in his deposition 
of September 13, 1991, destroyed material evidence and encouraged 
Risko to testify falsely about events surrounding the draft of 
Risko's letter to UJB.  The Director stated: 
  The OTS has a right to accurate and 
reliable information in the course of its 
examinations and investigations.  Seidman's 
lack of integrity, evidenced by his 
misleading testimony, his attempts to destroy 
evidence and his attempts to solicit false 
and misleading testimony, poses as a natural 
consequence an abnormal risk of loss or 
damage to the institution, the very essence 
of an unsafe or unsound practice.  The 
Director concludes that Seidman committed an 
unsafe and unsound practice by these attempts 
to obstruct the OTS investigation.  
 
  . . .  
 
   Seidman benefitted from his efforts by 
depriving the OTS of reliable and material 
evidence, thwarting the OTS enforcement 
action and hampering the prompt resolution of 
the self-dealing charges.  Seidman 
demonstrated personal dishonesty by giving 
misleading testimony and omitting material 
facts during an OTS investigation and 
examination; destroying evidence; and 
soliciting another witness to give false 
testimony and destroy material evidence. 
 
 
  
Seidman App. at 119-20.  While the Director did not directly 
relate his conclusions to the statutory requirements, it is clear 
he concluded that Seidman's conduct during the investigation 
constituted an unsafe or unsound practice under section 
1818(e)(1)(A)(ii)37 and that Seidman satisfied the effect 
component of section 1818(e)(1)(B)(iii) by receiving a personal 
benefit. 
 We agree with the Director that hindering an OTS 
investigation is an unsafe or unsound practice as that term has 
come to be used in the banking industry.  Section 1818(e)(1)(A) 
can be satisfied by evidence showing the conduct with which an 
affiliated person like Seidman is charged falls within section 
1818(e)(1)(A)(ii)'s proscription of unsafe or unsound practices 
because it "is contrary to generally accepted standards of 
prudent operation" and "the possible consequences of [the act], 
if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to . . . 
the agenc[y] administering the insurance fund[]."  Gulf Federal 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 264 (quotation omitted); see also 
supra Part V.  We believe an attempt to obstruct an OTS 
investigation is such an act.  OTS is statutorily charged with 
preserving the financial integrity of the thrift system.  See 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1462(a) (West Supp. 1994); id. § 1463(a).  To meet 
that responsibility, OTS has the power to investigate.  See 12 
C.F.R. § 509.16 (1993).  Where a party attempts to induce another 
                     
37
.  The Director also concluded that Seidman's conduct violated 
a law or regulation under section 1818(e)(1)(A)(i)(I).  We do not 
question that conclusion. 
  
to withhold material information from the agency, the agency 
becomes unable to fulfill its regulatory function.  Such 
behavior, if continued, strikes at the heart of the regulatory 
function.  Seidman's attempt to obstruct the investigation, if 
continued, would pose an abnormal risk of damage to OTS.  
Accordingly, we hold that an attempt to hinder an OTS 
investigation constitutes an "unsafe or unsound practice," thus 
satisfying the act requirement of section 1818(e)(1)(A).38 
                     
38
.  We believe that Seidman's act of soliciting false testimony 
was an attempt on Seidman's part to hinder the OTS investigation.  
We also believe his attempt to destroy material evidence could be 
viewed as hindering an OTS investigation, although, in this 
respect, the Director failed to state his reasons for 
disregarding the ALJ's credibility finding that Seidman acted 
without intent to hinder the investigation.  See infra note 37.  
In addition, we note our disagreement with the Director's 
conclusion that Seidman gave deposition testimony that was 
"intentionally misleading as to material facts concerning 
Seidman's knowledge of the letter's contents and omitted material 
facts concerning the drafting of the letter." Seidman App. at 119 
(footnote omitted).  The transcript of Seidman's deposition 
reveals that the OTS investigator never directly questioned 
Seidman about the draft of the letter OTS charged him with 
concealing.  Instead, the investigator asked only whether Risko 
and he had discussed OTS's investigation of the circumstances 
surrounding Seidman's release from the UJB guarantee.  Seidman 
truthfully admitted that he had discussed the topic with Risko 
"two or three times."  Seidman App. at 46.  The investigator 
failed to ask Seidman about the initial draft of Risko's letter 
in support of the release, who had prepared the letter or what it 
meant, even though OTS not only knew about the early draft but 
had secretly obtained a copy of it. 
 
    Likewise, we do not think Seidman's failure to volunteer 
information about the draft of the Risko letter can, in and of 
itself, show an intent necessary to satisfy the culpable states 
of mind section 1818(e)(1)(C) requires.  To satisfy section 
1818(e)(1)(C) it must be shown that Seidman's act was either 
personally dishonest or in willful disregard of the safety of 
Crestmont. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(1)(C).  OTS never directly 
asked Seidman the questions it now charges him with evading.  A 
deponent's failure to volunteer information that the deponent 
  
 Our conclusion that Seidman's attempts to obstruct the 
OTS investigation constitute a prohibited act does not end our 
section 1818(e) inquiry.  The act must still have a prohibited 
effect with a culpable intent before the severe sanction of a 
removal and prohibition order may issue.  See Oberstar, 987 F.2d 
at 502.  Section 1818(e)(1)(C)'s culpability element of personal 
dishonesty is shown by the undisputed evidence that Seidman asked 
Risko to forget about the draft of the letter to UJB.39  The 
requirements of section 1818(e)(1)(B) remain. 
(..continued) 
might wish to conceal but is not directly asked about does not 
show an intent to deceive.  Accordingly, we believe Seidman's 
deposition testimony is, by itself, insufficient to show either 
of the states of mind section 1818(e)(1)(C) requires.  Cf. 
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973) ("Precise 
questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of 
perjury.  It may well be that petitioner's answers were not 
guileless but were instead shrewdly calculated to evade.  
Nevertheless, . . . any special problems arising from the 
literally true but unresponsive answer are to be remedied through 
the 'questioner's acuity' and not by a federal perjury 
prosecution."). 
39
.  We note, however, that the Director's determination that 
Seidman intentionally destroyed the draft letter to thwart the 
investigation may not be adequately supported.  The Director 
gives no reason for his decision to disregard the ALJ's finding 
that Seidman's testimony that he acted in anger and frustration 
without intent to destroy material evidence was credible.  
Seidman admits that he ripped up the initial draft of Risko's 
letter to UJB but says he acted in the heat of passion without an 
intent to conceal any improper conduct.  The ALJ who heard 
Seidman made a specific finding that this testimony was credible.  
See Seidman App. at 49 ("The finding of fact is . . . while 
Seidman destroyed the documents intentionally, it was done in a 
fit of anger and not for the purpose of destroying material and 
relevant evidence.").  The Director, without explanation, 
reversed this finding and concluded instead that Seidman's act of 
tearing up the draft was still another basis for the order of 
removal and prohibition. 
 
  
 The Director concluded that section 1818(e)(1)(B)'s 
requirement of an untoward or prohibited effect was satisfied 
because Seidman had benefitted from the release of his guarantee 
of FSA's loan to UJB.  We conclude, however, that none of 
Seidman's attempts to obstruct the OTS investigation resulted in 
any benefit to Seidman, the sole basis the Director relied on to 
satisfy section 1818(e)(1)(B)'s condition of an untoward or 
prohibited effect.  The Director made no other finding concerning 
any effect of Seidman's conduct that could satisfy section 
1818(e)(1)(B) other than his conclusion that "Seidman benefitted 
from his [attempt to obstruct the OTS investigation] by depriving 
OTS of reliable and material evidence, thwarting OTS enforcement 
action and hampering the prompt resolution of the self-dealing 
charges."  Seidman App. at 120.  Section 1818(e)(1)(B)(iii) 
proscribes an act from which the actor "has received financial 
gain or other benefit by reason of such violation, practice, or 
breach . . . ."  12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis 
added). 
 Seidman's attempt to solicit false testimony from Risko 
was rebuffed; therefore, Seidman received no benefit from his 
request that Risko forget about the draft letter.  Similarly, 
(..continued) 
    The Director's finding, contrary to the finding of the ALJ, 
that Seidman acted with one of the culpable states of mind the 
statute specifies when he attempted to destroy evidence of the 
draft is not explained in the record now before us.  We recognize 
that the Director owes no deference to the findings of an ALJ, 
see supra, typescript at 28-29, but if he rejects an ALJ's 
finding on a witness's credibility we think it would be better 
practice for him to state his reasons for disregarding it.  See 
Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1983). 
  
Seidman's destruction of a draft letter that OTS already 
possessed and his unwillingness to volunteer information in his 
deposition failed to thwart the OTS investigation. 
 Subsection (iii) requires a person who has committed an 
act that supports removal under section 1818(e)(1)(A) to have 
received an actual benefit from the act.  In that respect, it is 
unmistakenly different from 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(1)(B)(ii), 
which uses the subjunctive "could be prejudiced" to describe a 
potential effect on the depositors as one of the untoward results 
that are a necessary condition of an order removing an affiliated 
person like Seidman from his office and banning him from banking 
forever.  Section 1818(e)(1)(B)(iii)'s text is clear as to mode 
and tense, and we are bound by its text unless the result of 
following the text would be demonstrably at odds with Congress's 
intent.  See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 
U.S. 564, 571 (1982); Dutton v. Wolpoff and Abamson, 5 F.3d 649, 
654 (3d Cir. 1993).  The statute does not permit removal and 
prohibition for acts which fail to confer a benefit on the actor.  
It requires a benefit that has been received.  An unsuccessful 
attempt to secure a benefit is not one of the effects that can 
support removal and prohibition under section 1818(e)(1).  
Seidman has not received any actual benefit from his alleged 
attempts to obstruct the OTS investigation.  Therefore, we hold 
that the Director erred in concluding that section 1818(e)(1)(B) 
had been satisfied. 
 It therefore follows that the Director's order removing 
Seidman from office and banning him for life from the banking 
  
business was "unwarranted in law."  See Butz v. Glover Livestock 
Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973); Oberstar, 987 F.2d at 
503.  Accordingly, we will grant Seidman's petition for review 
and vacate the Director's order as it pertains to him.  This is 
not to say, however, that we approve of Seidman's conduct during 
the course of the OTS investigation.  We conclude only that OTS 
may not, on this record, impose the draconian sanction of removal 
and prohibition under section 1818(e) because all the conditions 
that statute imposes on that ultimate penalty have not been met.  
However, we believe, for the reasons discussed supra, that 
Seidman's attempts to obstruct the OTS investigation into his 
dealings with FSA and UJB, particularly his act of counseling 
Risko to withhold potentially material facts, do constitute an 
unsafe or unsound practice and so could support a cease and 
desist order and monetary penalties as authorized by section 
1818(b)(1).  While the notice of charges did not specifically 
request a cease and desist order with respect to Seidman's 
obstructionist conduct, it did ask for "[a]ny other relief deemed 
appropriate by the Director of OTS."  Seidman App. at 20.  Thus, 
we will remand so that the Director may consider whether a cease 
and desist order with accompanying civil penalties is appropriate 
in this instance.40 
 
                     
40
.  We believe the notice provisions of section 1818(b)(1) have 
been satisfied.  Seidman was put on notice of the facts alleged 
to constitute an unsafe or unsound practice by the notice of 
charges issued pursuant to section 1818(e)(4).  Compare 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1818(b)(1) and 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(4). 
  
 VII.  The Preliminary Suspension Order 
 Because we conclude we must vacate that part of the 
Director's order removing Seidman from his office at Crestmont 
and banning him from the banking industry, we find it unnecessary 
to address Seidman's argument that the district court erred in 
dismissing his action to enjoin enforcement of the OTS 
preliminary suspension.  Though we will remand for the Director 
to consider whether a cease and desist order should be entered 
against Seidman pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(b), that section 
of the governing statute, unlike section 1818(e), does not 
authorize entry of a preliminary suspension order.  See 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1818(b) and (e).  We will therefore vacate the 
Director's order suspending Seidman from his office at Crestmont 
and from participating in Crestmont's business activities. 
 
 VIII.  Summary 
 In sum, we will grant Seidman's petition for review of 
that part of the Director's order removing Seidman as a director 
of Crestmont and prohibiting him from participating in the 
banking industry and reverse that particular part of the order 
because the Director's conclusion that Seidman's attempts to 
obstruct OTS's investigation conferred a benefit upon him is not 
supported by substantial evidence on this record and is erroneous 
as a matter of law.  Nevertheless, because of the nature of 
Seidman's attempt to obstruct OTS and our conclusion that this 
attempt does constitute an unsafe or unsound practice, we will 
remand Seidman's case to the Director for him to consider whether 
  
Seidman should on this record be subjected to the lesser sanction 
of a cease and desist order along with any monetary penalties 
that may be properly imposed.  Because section 1818(b), unlike 
section 1818(e), does not authorize Seidman's removal from office 
and his prohibition from banking, we will also vacate the 
preliminary suspension order that the Director entered pursuant 
to section 1818(e)(3).41 
 
 IX.  Conclusion 
 For these reasons, we will grant Bailey's petition for 
review and reverse that part of the Director's order commanding 
him to cease and desist.  We will also grant Seidman's petition 
for review of that portion of the Director's order removing him 
from his position as director and chairman of the board of 
Crestmont, reverse it and remand Seidman's case to the Director 
                     
41
.  Because we will vacate the Director's temporary suspension 
order, Seidman's challenge to the district court's order 
declining jurisdiction at our Docket No. 92-5392 is moot.  This 
resolution also renders Seidman's and Bailey's challenge to the 
propriety of the remand to determine civil penalties moot.  
Seidman and Bailey both argued the Director's remand to the ALJ 
for further findings concerning the assessment of civil penalties 
unfairly gave OTS a second chance to make out its case.  While 
this issue is now moot, we nevertheless note that the applicable 
regulations expressly authorize the Director to remand the 
"action or any aspect thereof" to the ALJ.  12 C.F.R. 
§ 509.40(c)(2) (1993).  In the cases now before us, the Director 
determined that the agency incorrectly assigned the burden of 
production on the assessment and mitigation of penalties to 
Seidman and Bailey.  Exercising his regulatory authority to 
remand, the Director therefore sent the penalty issues back to 
the ALJ.  Other courts have permitted similar remands when 
questions about the burden of production and proof were present.  
See, e.g., Dazzio v. FDIC, 970 F.2d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1992); 
Merritt v. United States, 960 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1992). 
  
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Finally, 
we will vacate that part of the Director's order temporarily 
suspending Seidman from his office at Crestmont and from 
participating in Crestmont's business activities. 
  
IN THE MATTER OF SEIDMAN AND BAILEY 
Nos. 92-3722 and 92-3729 
SEIDMAN V. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION 
No. 92-5392                              
 
STAPLETON, J., Dissenting: 
 I agree that we have jurisdiction to review the cease 
and desist order against Bailey and the removal and prohibition 
order against Seidman.  Unlike my colleagues, I would deny both 
petitions for review.  As the Director noted at the beginning of 
his opinion, "[u]se of institutions by insiders for their own 
benefit has been one of the greatest threats to the safe and 
sound operation of savings associations and has exposed the 
Federal deposit insurance funds to significant risks."  App. 94.  
Fortunately, the risk created by the conduct of Seidman and 
Bailey in this matter did not result in actual loss to their 
savings association or to the Federal deposit insurance funds.  
That fortuity, however, does not mandate that we overturn the 
orders before us. 
 The Director found that Seidman had engaged in 
undisclosed negotiations with UJB to secure release of a 
substantial personal obligation by representing to UJB 
Crestmont's willingness to make end-user loans to financially 
qualified purchasers of a UJB debtor and had later obstructed the 
OTS's investigation of the matter.  The Director concluded that 
the self-dealing and the obstructive conduct provided independent 
bases for a removal and prohibition order.  With respect to 
  
Bailey, the Director concluded that he had engaged in an unsafe 
and unsound banking practice by causing a commitment to be made 
on a loan to a partnership in which Seidman had a financial 
interest without disclosing the transaction to the Board of 
Directors or the Senior Loan Committee.  I will examine each 
charge in turn. 
 
 I.   
 The ALJ and the Director found that Seidman had 
arranged with Poole & Co. to pursue a request by him that UJB 
release him from his $4.45 million personal guarantee.  They 
further found that Seidman drafted a letter for Risko to send on 
his behalf, along with a brief letter of his own asking for the 
release, pointing out that Seidman was the CEO of Crestmont, that 
Crestmont was entertaining requests for $1.7 million from 
prospective purchasers of property from Fulton Street Associates 
("FSA"), a developer financed by UJB, and that Seidman's personal 
guarantee created a conflict of interest problem which would 
foreclose Crestmont from acting favorably on those requests.  
Seidman was also found to have approved an addition to his draft 
representing that "Crestmont would be willing to consider future 
financing [of such purchasers], assuming qualified buyers."  App. 
41.  The letter was dispatched on May 31, 1991.  
 That the intended message was heard and understood is 
evidenced by the internal documents generated by UJB in response 
to Seidman's request.  The memo that went to UJB's Real Estate 
Asset Management Committee stated: 
  
 
  UJB has been approached by Lawrence B. 
Seidman, principal and guarantor of Fulton 
Street, requesting the release of his 
personal guaranty.  Mr. Seidman is Chairman 
of the Board of Crestmont Federal Savings and 
Loan, the institution providing end loan 
takeouts of our warehouse loan.  Mr. Seidman 
has conflict of interest in approving these 
takeouts while serving as UJB's guarantor and 
the project's principal.  Crestmont is 
currently reviewing $1.7MM in end loan 
financing requests in an illiquid market. In 
order to reduce our exposure in the project, 
it becomes necessary to release Mr. Seidman.  
The only other alternative would be to 
provide the end loan financing ourselves at 
roughly twice the dollar UJB already has out 
to Borrowers . . . . 
 
  Although Mr. Seidman shows a net worth 
of $1.4MM, his liquidity is only $116M.  In 
addition, he has recently contributed equity 
to the project, further depleting his 
liquidity.  He does generate an income of 
$225M p.a. as CEO of Crestmont; however, he 
can be more valuable to the repayment of our 
loan as a source of end loan financing. 
App. 42.  UJB's Executive Vice President Eberhardt initialed this 
memorandum and added:  "Agree.  End loan financing has been 
critical to recent sales success." 
 Eberhardt testified that there was not a broad market 
for financing industrial condominium projects and that Crestmont 
was one of the few institutions willing to provide financing to 
potential purchasers of FSA's industrial condominiums at the 
Boonton site.  The other members of the Committee agreed with 
Eberhardt's views and Seidman was notified on June 7, 1991, that 
UJB would release his guarantee.   
  
 Seidman did not advise Crestmont's Board of Directors 
or its President that he was seeking a release of his guarantee 
or that in pursuing a release he was trading on Crestmont's 
ability to provide end loan financing.   
 On June 1, 1991, an OTS examiner conducting an 
examination at Crestmont saw the first page of the draft letter 
sent in Risko's name to UJB.  OTS immediately commenced a formal 
investigation and Seidman's deposition was taken.  When 
questioned concerning the source of the arguments set forth in 
the letter favoring a grant of the release, Seidman gave the 
following testimony: 
  Q.  Did you discuss with Mr. Risko what 
he would write? 
 
  A.  I won't say we discussed it.  I saw 
the letter, but -- 
 
  Q.  Did you see the letter before he 
sent it to Mr. Eberhardt? 
 
  A.  He thinks he sent it to me the day 
he sent it, and my secretary called him and 
told him I said it was okay, but I don't 
recall seeing it, but I may have. 
 
  Q.  Okay. 
 
  A.  I wasn't really -- I'm sorry, 
 
  Q.  Did you discuss with him what 
position you would take with UJB to seek 
release from your personal guarantee? 
 
  A.  No. 
 
  Q.  How did he know?  Was it typical for 
him to write letters of this nature without 
discussing it with you? 
 
  
  A.  He knew the details backwards, 
forward and upside down.  He knew the deal 
much better than I did./  He was intimately 
involved in this transaction.  I was the 
outside guy.  I mean I was just the financial 
guy in this deal.  I knew almost nothing 
about this transaction.  He knew the tenants 
better than I did.  He stayed on it much 
better than I did. 
 
 * * * 
 
  Q.  Did you ask Mr. Risko -- I am sorry.  
Let me show you OTS No. 7, which is a letter 
from James Risko to Robert Eberhardt, dated 
May 31, 1991 and ask you if you recall seeing 
that letter. 
 
  A.  Yes.  This is the letter that I 
referred to before that Mr. Risko thinks he 
sent me the day he sent it to Mr. Eberhardt. 
 
  Q.  Okay.  And that is the letter where 
you thought your secretary said you had read 
it and that you didn't have any problems with 
it? 
 
  A.  Right. 
 
  Q.  Do you recall reviewing that letter? 
 
  A.  No. 
 
  Q.  Okay.  Now, how did Mr. Risko come 
up with those reasons?  Did you ever discuss 
with him, first of all, the fact that, and 
why don't you give me the letter for a 
second. 
 
  Did you discuss with him the fact that 
your position as Chairman of Crestmont 
Federal Savings & Loan may make the financing 
of certain condo purchasers impossible if you 
were also a partner in Fulton Street? 
 
  A.  No. 
 
  Q.  Okay.  Did you discuss with Mr. 
Risko the fact that the inability to finance 
the end users, does not serve the United 
  
Jersey Bank's position or that of the 
developer? 
 
  A.  Mr. Risko and I had a discussion two 
or three times.  We had that discussion, like 
I said before.  Even Bob Eberhardt, who 
stated either Bob or George Rinneman or 
Stackhouse, that if there were any end users 
that they felt to be qualified, that they 
should send them to UJB, and most likely UJB 
would make a considerate effort to do those 
end loan financing. 
 
  So, I mean that was discussed at one of 
the meetings.  I don't know if Mr. Risko was 
in that part of the conversation or not. 
App. 44-46. 
 As I have noted, the ALJ and the Director found, with 
ample record support, that Seidman was the author of all but the 
concluding sentence of the Risko letter and that he had approved 
the addition of that sentence.  While acknowledging that Seidman 
had not been asked direct questions in his deposition about the 
authorship of the letter, both the ALJ and the Director found the 
above quoted testimony to be "intentionally misleading" with 
respect to the source of the message conveyed in the Risko 
letter. 
 During the remainder of the investigation, Seidman was 
found to have (1) asked Risko and another principal of Poole & 
Co. to destroy relevant documents, (2) requested Risko to make 
false statements and avoid full disclosure and (3) personally 
destroyed material evidence in a fit of rage. 
 It is apparent to me from the text of the statute that 
Congress intended courts to defer the agency's determination of 
  
what constitutes an "unsafe and unsound practice".42  As my 
colleagues acknowledge, Seidman's efforts to obstruct the 
investigation of the regulating agency undeniably constituted an 
"unsafe and unsound practice."43  Since I cannot say the Director 
was arbitrary or capricious in similarly characterizing Seidman's 
secret negotiations with UJB, I would sustain the conclusion of 
the Director that Seidman's conduct satisfied § 1818(e)(1)(A) in 
two different ways. 
 The legislative history of the 
Act provides 
the following 
general insight 
into what 
Congress meant 
by an "unsafe 
and unsound" 
practice:  
                     
42
.  As the court noted in Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of 
Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978): 
 
 [t]he phrase "unsafe or unsound banking 
practice" is widely used in the regulatory 
statutes and in case law, and one of the 
purposes of the banking acts is clearly to 
commit the progressive definition and 
eradication of such practices to the 
expertise of the appropriate regulatory 
agencies. 
43
.  My colleagues do not acknowledge that Seidman's deposition 
testimony constituted "an unsafe and unsound practice" apparently 
because they do not find it materially misleading.  As I explain 
hereafter in applying § 1818(c)(1)(B), I disagree. 
  
 
 [A]n "unsafe or unsound practice" embraces 
any action, or lack of action, which is 
contrary to generally accepted standards of 
prudent operation, the possible consequences 
of which, if continued, would be abnormal 
risk of loss or damage to an institution, its 
shareholders, or the agencies administering 
the insurance funds. 
MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 
1990) (quoting from 112 Cong.Rec. 26474 (1966)), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part on other grounds, Board of Governors v. MCorp Fin., 
Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991).  I do not disagree with my colleagues 
that the required "abnormal risk of loss or damages" refers to 
something more serious than the consequences of a breach of 
contract in the regular course of the bank's business.  On the 
other hand, it seems clear from the above-quoted legislative 
history that the relevant "risk" is not that occasioned by the 
specific conduct engaged in in this particular case, but rather 
the risk that would be occasioned if similar conduct were 
"continued" as a way of doing business. 
 The record reflects that the market for end-user loans 
for industrial condominiums was thin.  It further reflects that 
Boonton project had experienced financial difficulties, that few 
commercial lenders were willing to undertake end user financing 
for that project, and the UJB, Boonton's principal debt financer, 
was concerned about getting its money back.  Crestmont had loan 
applications for a substantial amount of end user financing from 
prospective purchasers of Boonton properties.  It had not 
previously engaged in such financing and it was faced with a 
  
decision on whether it was in the bank's best interest to extend 
credit under these circumstances.  Seidman's was a very 
influential voice in Crestmont's decision making process on such 
matters. 
 It was against this background that Seidman approached 
UJB seeking release of his guarantee without informing his fellow 
officers and directors.  To secure that release, he drafted, 
approved, and caused to be dispatched, the Risko letter.  It was 
clearly not unreasonable for the ALJ and the Board to understand 
this as a successful effort by Seidman to use the bank's ability 
to provide Boonton financing in order to secure a personal 
benefit.  To be sure, Seidman testified that his letter was 
motivated by his desire to put Crestmont in a position to make 
loans he thought were desirable from its point of view and 
neither the ALJ nor the Director made a finding that this 
subjective motivation did not exist.  It thus may be that 
Crestmont, as well as Seidman, under other circumstances might 
have benefitted from the release of Seidman's guarantee.  But 
Seidman's reliance on his motivation ignores the fact that he 
failed to disclose his release and the representation he made as 
to Crestmont's willingness to provide end user financing to 
purchasers of Boonton property who were financially qualified. 
 While it is true that Seidman made no legally binding 
commitment on behalf of Crestmont in the course of seeking the 
release of his $4.5 million guarantee, it was not arbitrary and 
capricious for the Director to recognize that communications like 
Seidman's Risko letter and responsive actions like those of UJB 
  
would have a significant potential for affecting decision making 
at the bank, a potential that was greatly increased by Seidman's 
failure to disclose his activities.  It is not unrealistic, it 
seems to me, to believe that the judgment of someone in Seidman's 
position on whether to undertake Boonton end-user financing would 
be influenced, if not altogether controlled, by his release.  
Nor, I believe, is it unrealistic, given Seidman's failure either 
to reveal the release transaction to his co-fiduciaries or to 
disqualify himself from participating in discussions of Boonton's 
financing, for the Director to perceive an abnormal risk that the 
bank's decision making process regarding that financing would be 
substantially skewed. 
 In short, I do not think the Director acted arbitrarily 
or capriciously in concluding that a continuing practice of 
undisclosed trading on the chief executive's corporate influence 
for personal benefit would hold an abnormal risk of loss or 
damage to the bank. 
 Turning to Section 1818(e)(1)(B), I would sustain the 
Director's conclusions once again.  While Seidman contends 
otherwise, the Director was clearly justified in concluding that 
Seidman benefitted from the release of his $4.5 million 
guarantee.  I believe he was also entitled to find that Seidman 
benefitted from his obstructive tactics during the investigation.  
While I agree that, fortuitously, Seidman did not benefit from 
his efforts to suborn perjury and destroy evidence, this leaves 
his materially misleading deposition testimony.  In the words of 
the Director, "Seidman benefitted from his efforts by depriving 
  
the OTS of reliable and material evidence, thwarting the OTS 
enforcement action and hampering the prompt resolution of the 
self-dealing charges."  App. 120. 
 I do not agree with my colleagues' apparent position 
that misleading testimony before an investigating regulatory 
agency cannot constitute an "unsafe and unsound practice" unless 
it is perjurious.  Accordingly, I have no difficulty with the 
failure of the examiners to ask more specific questions.   Nor 
can I agree with my colleagues that Seidman's testimony was not 
materially misleading.  As I read the transcript, Seidman did not 
acknowledge that he was the source of the strategy reflected in 
the Risko letter and, indeed, purposefully led the examiner to 
believe he was not.  At the time of the deposition, the agency 
did not know that Seidman was the author of that strategy and 
that fact was clearly material to an investigation into whether 
Seidman had secretly traded on his influence at the bank to 
secure a release of his personal guarantee. 
 Finally, I turn to § 1818(e)(1)(C).  Based on my 
reading of the Seidman deposition, the ALJ and the Director were 
justified in concluding that Seidman's conduct involved "personal 
dishonesty" within the meaning of subsection (i).  I also believe 
they were justified in finding that Seidman's undisclosed 
negotiations with UJB demonstrated a "willful . . . disregard for 
the safety and soundness" of the bank within the meaning of 
subsection (ii). 
 "Willful" is a word that has different meaning in 
different contexts, and the courts have not yet defined it in the 
  
context of subsection (ii).  Whatever the precise definition may 
turn out to be, however, I am satisfied that the "willful 
disregard" requirement of subsection (ii) is met in this case.  
The undisclosed negotiations with UJB found by the Director to be 
an unsafe and unsound practice were intentional and deliberate. 
That Seidman has a subjective appreciation of the wrongfulness of 
his conduct and of the risk conduct of that kind poses for a bank 
can reasonably be inferred from the fact that he tried to cover 
up his conduct when the investigation commenced.   
 
 II. 
 Mr. Bailey's case is a more sympathetic one, but it 
seems relatively clear to me that the Director did not abuse his 
discretion in issuing a cease and desist order directing that 
Bailey's conduct with respect to the Levine loan application not 
be repeated. 
 Steven Levine applied to Crestmont in December of 1990 
for end-user financing for the purchase of a commercial 
condominium at the Boonton project.  The Boonton Project was 
owned by FSA, a partnership in which Bailey knew Seidman was a 
general partner.   
 A mortgage commitment on the Levine application was 
issued by Crestmont on March 19, 1991, and modified on April 12, 
1991.  For some reason, Levine and FSA did not consummate the 
purchase at that time, and the commitment was not timely 
accepted.  Negotiations continued, however, and a contract for 
the purchase, for the price of $466,680, was entered into on May 
  
10, 1991.  A superseding commitment letter was issued by 
Crestmont on May 19, 1991, through Bailey, committing to a loan 
of $375,000.  The purchaser accepted the commitment letter after 
its expiration date, with delivery of a deposit check for $2,000, 
which was deposited by Crestmont. 
 Under Crestmont's internal operating rules, any loan 
transaction in which an officer or director of Crestmont had an 
interest had to be submitted to the Senior Loan Committee for 
approval.  Bailey, Seidman, and Crestmont's then president, Mr. 
McClellan constituted the Senior Loan Committee.  The bank's 
commitments to the Levine financing were made without the 
approval of the Senior Loan Committee.  Neither Mr. McClellan nor 
anyone else on Crestmont's Board of Directors were informed 
before these commitments were made that Levine wished financing 
for a purchase of property from a partnership in which Seidman 
had a financial interest.44 
 Bailey asked Seidman and his partners on three 
occasions about the fact that Seidman had an interest in the 
transaction Levine wished to finance.  On each occasion, he was 
advised that Seidman was "getting out" of FSA and it was Bailey's 
understanding that Levine wouldn't actually be given any money 
                     
44
.  It is true, as my colleagues stress, that Seidman had 
disclosed his interest in FSA on the conflict of interest forms 
he had filed with the bank prior to the approval of the Levine 
financing and that McClellan testified he reviewed those forms 
from time to time.  But the ALJ and the Director concluded, with 
record support, that because of Bailey's failure to submit the 
Levine application to the Senior Loan Committee, McClellan was 
not exposed to any communication alerting him to the fact that 
Levine's application related to a purchase from FSA. 
  
unless and until Seidman was "out."  As I have noted, Seidman did 
not get all the way "out" until UJB released his $4.45 million 
guarantee at some point after June 7, 1991.  Indeed, when the 
commitments were made, Seidman and his partners were attempting 
to renegotiate FSA's financing with UJB and Seidman's 
participation was understood by all to be necessary to reaching 
an agreement with UJB on a reorganization.  Agreement was reached 
on May 20, 1991, and it was on that day that Seidman signed his 
guarantee.  Thus, at the time of each of the three bank 
commitments made to Levine with Bailey's approval, Seidman had an 
interest in the transaction Levine intended to finance. 
 Bailey's understanding that Levine would get no money 
until Seidman was "out" of FSA does not mean the Director erred 
in finding an "unsafe and unsound practice" and issuing a cease 
and desist order.  Conflicts of interest are important because of 
the potential they hold for undermining an institution's decision 
making process.  Here Seidman and Bailey made the decisions to 
commit the bank to Levine when Seidman had a conflicting interest 
and when Seidman's and Bailey's judgments were susceptible to 
being influenced by that conflicting interest.  That is the 
crucial fact that makes Bailey's conduct an "unsafe and unsound 
practice" in the Director's eyes.  Seidman and Bailey obviously 
had no plans to submit Levine's loan application to the Senior 
Loan Committee or anyone else before the financing was issued.  
For better or for worse, if events had transpired as Seidman and 
Bailey anticipated in the Spring of 1991 they would, the bank 
would have made a substantial loan based on the judgment of 
  
Seidman and Bailey exercised when Seidman's personal fortunes 
were very much still tied to those of FSA.   
 Crestmont's loan policy prohibited loans being approved 
in the manner Seidman and Bailey approved the Levine financing 
precisely because a continuing practice of approving loans in 
that manner would pose an abnormal risk to the financial 
stability of the bank.  I am unwilling to fault the Director for 
reaching the same conclusion Crestmont's management did when it 
established its rules. 
 
 III. 
 I would deny the petitions of Seidman and Bailey for 
review. 
